滙豐：中國的金融平衡術-金融去槓桿vs.經濟層面去槓桿

China』s balancing act： Financial vs. economy-wide de-leveraging

金融去槓桿當然是對的，就如現在給wd,hh,ab,fx四大家族開刀問診一樣，但如果搞的不好，就可能引來一場新的危機。

基本結論

Growth in China』s debt-GDP ratio has already decelerated sharply to a five year low, due to the cyclical growth recovery

Yet financial de-leveraging, if not well co-ordinated, would risk a re-acceleration in the economy-wide debt-to-GDP ratio

Beijing must strike a delicate balance between regulatory tightening and growth

Over the past year, China』s cyclical recovery has become more broad-based, moving from construction to manufacturing, trade, and services. These sectors, which are less policy-driven and more dominated by private companies bode well for the sustainability of the upturn. However, some investors remain concerned about the debt overhang. We have already laid out our views on China』s debt levels in two earlier reports. One looks at debt in the context of China』s high savings rate (How worrying is China』s debt? 21 April 2016), and the other looks at its structural implications (70% of China』s corporate sector debt is in state-owned enterprises; household and government debt levels are low, see China』s dual-track economy, 29 May 2017). Recently, there are concerns that China』s debt-to-GDP ratio has grown at an above-trend pace, resulting in a larger 『credit gap』.

Such concerns are overplayed. In fact, growth in China』s credit-to-GDP ratio has already slowed sharply over the past three quarters, thanks to a recovery in nominal GDP growth.

The passing of the inflation 『peak』 means that the nominal GDP growth may slow in the coming quarters. But the growth in the economy』s debt-to-GDP ratio will nevertheless remain more contained so long as the recovery in the private sector continues.

As we noted in a recent report (China』s dual-track economy, 29 May 2017), China』s growth mix (driven by the private sector) stands in sharp contrast to its debt mix (mostly in state-owned enterprises). The current private sector-led growth recovery is good from the perspective of sustainability and efficiency and should, over time, further ease concerns over debt levels. To sustain this, accommodative macro policies are needed. Although recent moves to curb shadow lending are necessary to contain leverage risks in the financial system, overly-tight financial conditions could derail the recovery and drag the economy back into deflation. Beijing policymakers are aware of this risk. Indeed, the PBoC has been more pro-active with liquidity injections in order to re-assure markets.

Balancing financial deleveraging with the growth recovery is only one part (albeit an important part) of the story. SOE reforms, such as shutting down zombie companies, is also a must. But a recovering private sector can help with this as well. It makes it easier

for resources to be deployed, therefore allowing policy makers to make the difficult choices when executing SOE reforms.

What is a 『credit gap』?

Compared to a year ago, investor sentiment regarding China has changed quite dramatically.

Concerns over a 『hard landing』 have receded, replaced by debate over the sustainability of the economic recovery. However, concern over debt levels remain. After the downgrade of the sovereign credit rating by Moody』s, concern over the acceleration in debt-to-GDP ratio in recent years (or the 『credit gap』, defined as actual debt-to-GDP ratio over trend) resurfaced. So, how concerned should we be?

When it comes to China』s debt levels, regular readers may know that we take a more nuanced view, on the basis of two considerations. First, the level of savings – which is a simple way of measuringaffordability or stability of debt. Even as the level of debt (debt as a % of GDP) in China is relatively high for a developing economy, its level of savings (savings as a % of GDP) is even higher. China』s savings rate is, in fact, the highest in the world. In a report last year, we had argued that when we put China』s debt level next to its savings rate, its debt level looks far more commensurate and stable compared with most emerging market economies (How worrying is China』s debt? 21 April 2016).

Second, the composition of the debt suggests that high and rising debt is not a reflection of an economy-wide issue of debt dependence or inefficiency. In another recent report (China』s dualtrack economy: The 70-30 split, 29 May 2017), we discussed the phenomenon that 70% of China』s corporate debt (the most leveraged sector in the economy) is concentrated in state-

owned enterprises. The state-owned sector, however, accounts for an increasingly small part of the economy. This means that SOE reform will have a better chance at 『de-leveraging』 than austerity. It also means that broad-based tightening is not the optimal solution, given that a large part of the corporate sector has a relatively low debt burden.

But debt levels aside, is the pace at which debt growth outpaces GDP growth, or the so called 『credit gap』 a more valid concern? To answer that question, we first need to define the gap. In this report, we follow standard practice that defines 『credit gap』 as the gap between the debt-to-GDP level of the non-government sector, and a certain 『trend』. Chart 2 for example, shows actual debt against a linear trend. Measured against this trend, China』s debt-to-GDP ratio appears to have accelerated, rising above trend since 2012. Chart 3 shows an alternative measure, a non-linear trend used by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS). Measured against this non-linear benchmark, China』s credit-to- GDP ratio has moved away from trend since 2009.

點擊展開全文

喜歡這篇文章嗎？立刻分享出去讓更多人知道吧！