美國近期「專利適格性」的勝訴案件著重於事實調查
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發布：IPRdaily中文網（IPRdaily.cn）
作者：Jacob C. Bachman律師 及 Walter C. Frank律師
供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務所
原標題：美國近期「專利適格性」的勝訴案件著重於事實調查
IPRdaily導讀：本篇文章集合近期美國聯邦巡迴法院對不適格專利主題的性質，因在權利要求中列述了額外的要素而轉化為適格專利主題的案件匯總。聯邦法院認為權利要求主題只有在加入了一個超越「易於理解（well-understood）、常規（routine）、之前被研究員在該領域實踐過的傳統活動（conventional activity）」才可成為適格專利主題。
在35 U.S.C. § 101規定下，可授權專利主題包括「陽光底下一切的人為事物」，暗含不包含自然法則（laws of nature）、自然現象（natural phenomena）及抽象概念（abstract ideas），其均不可申請專利。
在最高法院對聯邦法院Alice案判決意見予以肯定後，法院對不適格專利主題的性質是否因在權利要求中列述了額外的要素而轉化為適格專利主題申請進行裁決。
權利要求主題只有在加入了一個超越「易於理解（well-understood）、常規（routine）、之前被研究員在該領域實踐過的傳統活動（conventional activity）」才可成為適格專利主題。
當適格專利主題被視為一項法律上的問題，不適格專利主題加入額外權利要求要素的轉化則包含了事實問題。
在最高法院作出對Mayo案的裁決後，被告在專利訴訟中成功利用§ 101條款作為工具，通過辯稱權利要求只採用了易於理解、常規及傳統活動，在早期撤銷動議中依法律判決對專利進行無效。這一趨勢使得相當多的申請人對主題普遍涉及抽象概念或自然法則領域的申請減少遞交量。
然而近期幾項聯邦巡迴法院的判決建議，除了Mayo的判決意見外還有其它的考慮因素，特別在解決對事實問題的爭議上，及通過使用§ 101進行簡易判決動議及撤銷動議來無效權利要求。
在Berkheimer v HP, Inc.一案中，聯邦巡迴法院認為在簡易判決階段對涉案領域內什麼屬於易於理解的事實問題作出判決為時過早，因此並不合適。
接下一周，在Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.中，聯邦巡迴法院將這一推理延伸至此案的判決中，指出只在沒有事實指控的情況下§ 101才可用於撤銷動議，依法律判決權利要求無效，反之則阻止解決專利適格性問題。
最後，在Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc.一案中，對Exergen所宣稱的核心體溫計算裝置採用了關於體溫的自然法則並無爭議。這項案件中，在陪審團裁定主張的權利要求被侵權及並非無效後，被告基於不適格專利主題遞交了無效權利要求的請求，地區法院駁回該請求。被告進行上訴，聯邦巡迴法院根據§ 101條款對專利適格性問題進行了重新審查，採用「明顯錯誤」原則（clear error standard, 為了推翻地區法院的事實認定，上訴法院必須證明裁決存在「明顯錯誤」。）複審了地區法院關於什麼是常規、慣例及易於理解的事實認定。
聯邦法院的結論是「儘管所主張的權利要求是基於自然現象，」該自然現象已轉換成「非侵入性及準確測量人體體溫的創新方法及實用裝置」，因此涉案權利要求「並非傳統、常規或易於理解的。」
作為對該結論的支持，聯邦巡迴法院依據基本的事實，指出「不能僅僅因為在現有技術文獻中被披露，既認為一些權利要求是易於理解、常規及傳統的。」法院隨後指出原告在對所宣稱發明進行測試及研發中所投入的大量時間和資金。
傳統上由法律判決所主導的訴訟領域，近期的判決在對事實問題的關註上與日增長並在訴訟中呈現。
對於專利申請人來說，對權利要求的組合或轉化使其不太可能被認為屬於傳統、常規、或易於理解進行的預測及定義需求增加，以確保專利組合可以作為商業工具被準備、維持或主張。
直至法院未來對什麼可構成超越「易於理解、常規及傳統活動」的發明構思加以闡明，建議專利申請人及訴訟律師應密切關注案件爭議事項的事實。
附：英文全文
Recent Decisions In Favor Of Patent Eligibility Focus On Factual Inquiries
Patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes 「anything under the sun that is made by man」 with the implicit exception that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.[1]Following the Supreme Court』s affirmance of the Federal Circuit』s holding in Alice[2], courts determine whether the nature of otherwise ineligible subject matter is transformed into a patent-eligible application by reciting additional elements in the claim. The claimed subject matter is only patent-eligible if it adds an inventive concept beyond 「well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.」[3]While subject matter eligibility is viewed as a matter of law, transformations of ineligible subject matter by additional claim elements involve questions of fact.
In the wake of the Supreme Court』s decision in Mayo, defendants in patent suits successfully utilized § 101 as a tool to invalidate patents as a matter of law on early motions to dismiss,by arguing that the claims employed only well-understood, routine, conventional activity. This trend has led some applicants to consider reducing the number of filings in subject matter areas where abstract ideas or laws of nature are common.
However, several recent Federal Circuit decisions have suggested there may be considerations beyond the holdings in Mayo, particularly to address disputes over questions of fact, and especially when motions for summary judgment or to dismiss use § 101 to invalidate claims.
In Berkheimer v HP, Inc.[4], the Federal Circuit held that it may be untimely and thus inappropriate at the summary judgment stage to resolve questions of fact about what was well-known by researchers in the field. The following week, in Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,[5]the Federal Circuit extended this line of reasoning to cases decided on the pleadings, noting that § 101 can be used in motions to dismiss to invalidate claims as a matter of law, only when there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the patent eligibility question.
Finally, in Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc.[6], there was no dispute that Exergen』s claimed core body temperature calculation device employed a law of nature about body temperature. In that case, after a jury found the asserted claims infringed and not invalid, the defendant moved for invalidity of the claims as ineligible subject matter, which the district court denied. The defendant appealed, and the Federal Circuit reviewed the issue of patent eligibility under § 101 de novo, applying the deferential 「clear error」 standard of review to the district court』s factual findings regarding what was routine, conventional, and well understood. The Federal Circuit concluded that 「while the asserted claims are based in natural phenomena,」
the natural phenomena were transformed into 「inventive methods and useful devices that noninvasively and accurately detect human body temperature,」 and therefore were 「not conventional, routine, or well understood.」 In support of its conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied on underlying facts, noting that 「[s]omething is not well-understood, routine, and conventional merely because it is disclosed in a prior art reference,」[7]and further highlighted the significant time and money invested in the testing and development of the claimed invention.[8]
In an area of litigation traditionally dominated by matters of law, recent decisions have focused on the growing importance of matters of fact and their presentation in patent lawsuits. For patent applicants, there is an increasing need to anticipate and define combinations or transformations that will not likely be perceived as conventional, routine, or well understood, to ensure that patent portfolios can be prepared, maintained, or asserted as effective business tools.
Until the courts further clarify what constitutes an inventive concept beyond 「well-understood, routine, conventional activity,」 applicants and litigators alike are well advised to pay close attention to the facts of the matter in dispute.
注釋：
[1] Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Mayo v. Promethius, 566 U.S. 66, 70-71, (2012).
[2] Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. (2014). [3] Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
[4] Berkheimer v HP, Inc., No. 2017-1437 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2018).
[5] Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 2017-1452 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14,2018).
[6] Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., No. 2016-2315 (Fed. Cir. March 8, 2018). [7] Id. at p. 10.
[8] Id. at p. 11.
發布：IPRdaily中文網（IPRdaily.cn）
作者：Jacob C. Bachman律師 及 Walter C. Frank律師
供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務所
編輯：IPRdaily趙珍 校對：IPRdaily縱橫君
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