全球腦庫：裂變中的多邊主義國際體系
【世界決定視界】【視界決定世界】
歡迎打開「我與我們的世界」，從此，讓我們一起縱覽世界之風雲變幻、洞察社會之脈搏律動、感受個體之生活命運、挖掘自然之點滴奧妙。
我與我們的世界，既是一個奮鬥的世界，也是一個思考的世界。奮而不思則罔，思而不奮則殆。這個世界，你大，它就大；你小，它就小。
歡迎通過上方公眾號名稱打開公眾號「查看歷史消息」來挖掘往期文章，因為，每期都能讓你「走近」不一樣的世界、帶給你不一樣的精彩。
本期導讀：多邊主義，是指多個不同的國家，而不是單一國家，一起合作處理問題、解決紛爭的理念。一般情況下，人們將研究多邊外交行為和活動的理論稱為「多邊主義」。多邊主義是指「兩個以上的國家進行國際合作，旨在解決國際問題，處理由於國際關係中人們所認知的或實際存在的無政府狀態所引發的衝突」。
按照約翰·羅傑的解釋，是指「根據普遍的行為原則，協調三個或三個以上國家間關係的一種制度形式。」除了這種從制度層面界定外，多邊主義還表現為國家行為體之間的行為方式，以及對國際普遍的行為準則和規制的重視和遵守。
作為一種著眼於發展國家行為體之間良性互動的社會性安排，協調與合作是多邊主義的基本特徵。多邊主義有助於國家化解相互間的矛盾和分歧，從根本上擺脫彼此間的安全困境，創設廣泛的和平穩定的地區安全環境。國際機構如聯合國、G20、歐盟、世界銀行、世界衛生組織及世界貿易組織都是奉行多邊主義的機構。
Is Multilateralism Finished?
多邊主義完蛋了？！
By Zaki La?di
Abstract:Although Donald Trump certainly deserves blame for disrupting global trade and security arrangements, the roots of today』s crisis of multilateralism run deeper than his presidency. As new powers emerge to rival the United States, the world should prepare for a future in which global cooperation is no longer an option.
文章提要：儘管特朗普確實需要對擾亂全球貿易、破壞世界安全擔負一定責任，但多邊主義目前所面臨的危機根源，卻比特朗普的所做作為要深得多。隨著新興力量對美國逐漸構成系列挑戰，我們這個世界需要做好準備，未來全球範圍內的多邊主義合作，或許不再是大家的一個選擇。
In the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump』s election to the US presidency, it was reasonable to wonder if the man would prove to be 「all bark and no bite」 once in office.For various reasons, many people were convinced that Trump』s beliefs and personality would have no real bearing on the exercise of American power, which is supposed to be stable over time. Yet after more than a year of Trump』s presidency,it has become increasingly clear that the malicious aspersions he cast on the international system are capable of drawing blood.
特朗普贏得美國大選後那會兒，當時人們覺得特朗普當了總統後「只會叫而不會咬」，確實有一定道理。畢竟，可列舉出很多因素，足以讓人們相信，特朗普的理念和個性會受到限制，不會對一直都理應極具穩定性的美國力量在國際社會的運用，帶來什麼實質性影響。不過，特朗普自就任總統到現在一年多以來，有個越來越明顯的現象就是：特朗普對國際體系的惡性怨懟，正變成血淋淋的現實。
Trump withdrew from the 12-countryTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)as one of his first official acts in office, and he ended America』s participation in theParis climate agreementnot long thereafter. Meanwhile, his administration has launched unprecedented attacks on theWorld Trade Organization, by accusing it of infringing upon American sovereignty, and by blocking the appointment of judges to itsAppellate Body.
小編註：
世貿組織上訴機構：the Appellate Bodyof the World Trade Organization is a standing body of seven persons that hears appeals from reports issued by panels in disputes brought on by WTO members. It was established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a panel, and Appellate Body Reports, once adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), must be accepted by the parties to the dispute. The Appellate Body has its seat in Geneva, Switzerland.
In another rebuke to the WTO this spring, the Trump administration announced sweeping import tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum, the costs of which will fall largely on Europe and Japan, owing to exemptions that have been granted to other countries. The Trump administration is also threatening to impose additional tariffs on $100 billion worth of Chinese goods. And, in an episode reminiscent of the colonial era, it is pressuring China to drop its complaints against the United States at the WTO without a reciprocal commitment.
But if Trump』s trade policies were not evidence enough that he is taking a nationalist sledgehammer to the rules-based system, then his decision this month to renege on the 2015Iran nuclear dealdrives the point home. There can no longer be any doubt that he intends to defy the multilateral institutions that the US itself played a primary role in creating and sustaining throughout the postwar era. To be sure, certain strains of American political culture have long cast doubt on the value of multilateralism. Butwith the rise of Trump, distrust has turned into outright hostility.
FEAR AND LOATHING IN TRUMPLAND
惶惶不安、滿腹怨氣的特朗普王國
With the departure of more mainstream White House officials such as Gary Cohn, the former director of the National Economic Council, and H.R. McMaster, the former national security adviser,Trump』s disdain for internationalism is now driving his administration』s agenda. Accordingly, one of the administration』s key objectives is to replace the rules-based system with one based solely on outcomes. To Trump』s mind, rules and principles are irrelevant; what matters are results (or at least good ratings).The ends always justify the means.
A perfect illustration of this is Trump』s volte face on the Chinese technology firm ZTE, which his administration recently banned from purchasing US inputs, owing to national security concerns and previous violations of US sanctions against Iran and North Korea. Trump has now instructed the US Department of Commerce to reconsider the ban, presumably with the hope that the Chinese will reduce exports to the US, thereby closing the US-China trade deficit and delivering on one of his central campaign promises.
The Trump administration also seems to bedispensing with America』s allies, which the US now treats with indifference, if not contempt. As Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA, recently toldDer Spiegel, America has 「a president who views allies as a burden.」 By this twisted logic, it stands to reason that the US should extract economic concessions from them.
小編註：
Der Spiegel：《明鏡周刊》，德國發行的周刊，每周平均發行量近110萬冊，該雜誌自稱是「德國最重要的且在歐洲發行量最大的新聞周刊」。
Taken together,Trump』s onslaught against the rules-based system and America』s alliances represents a veritable break from the past 70-plus years of US foreign policy. Even former President George W. Bush, whose invasion of Iraq clearly violated the United Nations Charter, never renounced US allies. Of course, Bush did his best to divide them, with the support of Tony Blair, but he still saw allies as necessary for conferring legitimacy on his administration』s actions abroad. And, rather than threatening multilateral commercial arrangements, he expanded a number of bilateral trade deals and encouraged dialogue between the US and the European Union at the WTO.
HISTORY TRUMPS TRUMP
歷史性大勢強於個體性行為
Though Trump is unprecedented in American political history, it would be a mistake to assume that the end of his presidency will usher in a renaissance of multilateralism. The fact is thatmany of the factors behind today』s crisis of multilateralism predate Trump and will persist long after he is gone. Multilateralism is faltering at the precise moment that the international order is becoming more multipolar. The question we should be asking, then, is whether multilateralism and multipolarity are compatible.
One might think that in an international system where power is spread more widely than in the past, the need for consensus through negotiation and dialogue would be commensurately greater. But while that might be normatively true,recent events show that the world is heading in a different direction.
For example,Russia, wielding its veto powerat the United Nations Security Council, continues to stand in the way of any resolution to the war in Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin seems completely uninterested in addressing the crisis multilaterally, and has instead pursued a narrower peace process alongside Iran and Turkey, with the obvious goal of diminishing America』s influence in the Middle East.
Thedeadlock at the WTOis equally apparent. The December 2017 WTO ministerial conference in Buenos Aires was a failure, even after the agenda had been deliberately narrowed to deliver at least a limited result. And long before that, the Doha Development Round – first launched in 2001 – was pronounced dead and buried. Today, with only a few exceptions, even far more limited accords, such as 2015 expansion of the Information Technology Agreement, which could be regarded as a template for so-called plurilateral agreements, concluded among like-minded states on a specific issue within the broad WTO framework, stand a small chance of success.
The crisis of multilateralism at the WTO has been brewing at least since 2008, when the Doha round stalled once and for all. When later efforts to restart the process collapsed, it was largely because of a symbolic disagreement between the Obama administration and the Indian government on the question of agricultural subsidies.
The Obama administration』s arguments at the time were much less aggressive than what one hears from Trump and his officials, but the grievances they addressed were not fundamentally different.The problem for the US, then as now, was that WTO negotiations no longer serve as a useful mechanism for containing China』s rise. Ironically, the need for new containment methods was a key factor in the Obama administration』s pursuit of the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which was also abandoned (though at a much earlier stage, and both parties were to blame for bad design and the wrong timetable).
TOO MANY COOKS IN THE KITCHEN
一山不藏二虎，也難容二虎
Still, ifTrump alone does not explain the crisis of multilateralism, what does? One hypothesis can be traced back to the economistMancur Olson』s 1965 bookThe Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. According to Olson, 「unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.」
小編註：
Mancur Olson：曼瑟爾·奧爾森（1932年－1998年2月19日），美國經濟學家和社會學家，對制度經濟學的諸多方面，包括私有財產、稅收、公共財、集體行動、合同權利等有很大貢獻。他在馬里蘭大學教書直到病逝。
If we simply replace 「individuals」 with 「states,」 it is easy to see how Olson』s analysis can be applied to today』s increasingly multipolar global order. Rather than encouraging multilateralism,a polycentric system creates a situation in which no one country is strong enough to impose its vision on the rest of world.
Polycentrism represents a departure from the postwar period. Between 1947 and 1995, the world trading system was governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and largely dominated by the US and Europe, with the later addition of Japan. During this period, trade disputes were largely the product of the shifting economic power balances among Western countries, particularly after the creation of the European single market and the rise of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s.
At the same time,trade agreements tended to reflect the interests of the dominant powerbloc, and thus focused almost exclusively on lowering tariff barriers for industry. China and the Soviet Union were non-factors, because they were not parties to the GATT negotiations. And developing countries, although they grew ever stronger, remained marginal, as did agriculture generally. Nevertheless, all GATT participants enjoyed most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and developing countries could benefit from Western markets with no obligation to reciprocate, in accordance with provisions for 「special and differential treatment.」
The GATT framework represented optimal multilateralism. Whilethe strongest power bloc imposed its will on the rest, it also made it easier for developing countries to comply with the established rules, while enjoying the fruits of trade. Carrots were more abundant than sticks. Butthis operational logic was torn asunder with China』s 2001 accession to the WTO(which succeeded the GATT in 1995). As the rise of emerging countries equalized the balance of power between the developed and the developing world,Western advanced economies lost their hegemony.
As a result of this rebalancing, the world trade agenda now reflects the priorities of both developed and developing countries, and those priorities are rarely aligned.This new divide poses a challenge for an institution that relies on consensus and the principle of single undertaking, and it helps to explain why broad international agreements on trade have become so rare. The WTO』s conference in Seattle in 1999 was an unmitigated failure, as was the conference in Cancún in 2003, when developing countries rejected a US/EU-negotiated pre-accord on agriculture. The conference in Hong Kong in 2005 was a small, ambiguous success; but it was followed by a complete washout in Geneva in 2008.
This litany of disappointment suggests thatdeadlock may be the norm for the WTO. And yet the WTO still has an immense role to play as a regulator and arbiter of trade disputes. It is here that the Trump administration poses the biggest risk to economic multilateralism. US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross has spent his time in office challenging the validity of the WTO』s MFN provision, which lies at the heart of the entire WTO framework. If the Trump administration』s sabotage persists,it is possible that the entire institutional architecture of world trade could collapse.
THE MEANING OF MULTILATERALISM
多邊主義對不同國家具有不同意義
Still, the current crisis of multilateralism should not be mistaken for its death throes.Most of the world』s major powers still support it.But in an increasingly multipolar world,multilateralism itself now means different things to different countries.
Start withChina, which publicly supports the WTO, even when it is penalized in dispute-settlement proceedings. The reason is not that China is a champion of multilateralism, but rather that it benefits from the status quo. China would prefer to see as few reforms to the global trading system as possible, because it does not want new rules to impede its economic growth. That is why it supported, behind the scenes, the tough Indian stance during the Doha Round.
Under the current system,China is still treated like the country it was in 2001, even though it is now one of the world』s leading economic powers. Much to the chagrin of Americans and Europeans, China has managed this feat while deferring its commitment to adopt a market economy. And India, for its part, has exploited the same double standard, by maintaining that Western countries should open their markets to developing countries without any expectation of reciprocity. India is very interested in exporting its qualified manpower, but equally keen to protect its agriculture and industry.The average Indian level of protectionism remains extraordinarily high compared to that of China.
Whereas these countries』 embrace of multilateralism is largely pragmatic,the EU』s is rooted in its fundamental values. Multilateralism is in the EU』s DNA, and thus is regarded as the only acceptable framework for governing trade. Fundamentally, the EU supports multilateralism because it is itself a multilateral construct. And it sees in multilateralism collective insurance against power politics. From a European perspective, existing international agreements should be used to confront China on contentious issues such as its subsidies regime, state-owned enterprises, and approach to intellectual property.
TheTrump administration』s failure to join with Europe to define a common position toward China is especially disheartening for Europeans. And the same frustration applies to Iran. European leaders share America』s concerns about Iran』s regional influence and its ballistic-missile program. But they regard those issues as separate from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the 2015 deal is officially known, which they believe should be preserved as long as Iran is in compliance with its terms.
Europeans now have good reason to fear that theTrump administration is intentionally dismantling the multilateral system so that it can pursue the kind of power politicsfor which the EU is utterly unequipped. Already, the ongoing power play between the US and China threatens to impose new costs on Europe. For example, if China agrees to limit its exports to the US market, it will immediately increase its exports to the EU, thereby dragging the bloc into a trade conflict it never sought.
This very real possibility suggests thatmultipolarity undercuts multilateralism by creating a structural advantage for strong statesto forge bilateral deals that yield short-term gains, regardless of the effects on global norms. Under such conditions, leading powers would not necessarily oppose multilateral rules across the board; but they would freely opt out of those rules when it suits them. The resulting erosion of global trade arrangements would be exceedingly difficult to repair.
THE REALITY ON THE GROUND
實際情況沒大家所擔心的那麼糟
Still, it does not follow that formal deregulation within the existing international system would cause it to collapse. Though the WTO is in crisis, theessential norms of international commerce continue to function. Most of these are long-established rules that were inherited from the GATT era – and that remain indispensable to the majority of WTO member states.
Moreover, the immediate crisis of the multilateral system has only a marginal effect on the volume of world trade, which isnow more dependent on global value chains– in a sense, the most effective instrument against protectionism –than on international accords. That is why we should not be excessively pessimistic about the future of the trading system, as long as the norms on which trade rests are respected. In fact, despite the repeated failures of multilateral trade negotiations over the past two decades, world trade since 2001 has grown dramatically. Trump is probably not in a position to derail this trend, which is by and large extremely favorable to US interests.
In trade negotiations, individual governments adopt a mercantilist vision of international trade that bears little resemblance to reality. Contrary to Trump』s obsessive grumbling about America 「losing」 to other countries on trade, everyone knows that bilateral trade deficits are of only limited economic importance.A current-account deficit reflects an imbalance between national savings and investment, not necessarily economic weakness or a lack of competitiveness.
Besides,gross imports and exports should not be taken at face value. As many economists have pointed out, the US trade deficit vis-à-vis China would be 33% smaller if the balance of value added was factored into the bilateral balance. Because it isn』t, an iPhone shipped to the US from China is recorded as a Chinese export worth $500, even though China added only around $20 to the final value.
The gap between trade rhetoric and reality under the Trump administration has created space for protectionist policies that could precipitate a global trade war. But, barring that outcome, the trading system will continue to allow for alternative approaches other than global-level negotiations. For example, plurilateral agreements – such as the new iteration of the TPP, led by Japan – will probably become the primary driver of global trade in the future.
QUID PRO STATUS QUO
能找什麼辦法補救，就找什麼辦法補救吧
Unfortunately,what works for trade does not necessarily work for security. There is no credible alternative to the JCPOA, and there is no reason to think the Trump administration even wants one. At best, EU leaders, along with Russia and China, might be able to salvage the deal by offering Iran relief from the reinstatement of US sanctions.
The situation in Syria is no better. Russia has no interest in a multilateral deal to end the conflict, because such an agreement would bring in Western powers, which it wants to keep out. The Trump administration, however, has more or less accepted the status quo. Although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad now controls some 60% of the country, US-backed Kurds control the most prosperous swaths of territory (in terms of oil, gas, and water) in the north and east, from which US Special Forces can cut into Iranian supply lines.
Rather than exhibiting true multipolarity,the global order is currently structured around a double bipolarity, with the US playing a leading roleon two separate fronts. The first isthe economic competition between the US and China, and the second isthe geopolitical struggle between the US and Russiain the Middle East and on NATO』s eastern flank. In fact, the current crisis of multilateralism reflects a superimposition of the twentieth-century competition between the US and Russia, and the twenty-first-century rivalry between the US and China.When raw power politics shapes the global system, multilateralism recedes.
Given that the parties to these conflicts are generally focused on maintaining or slightly modifying the status quo, there is no reason to think they will pursue multilateralism anytime soon. But there is also no reason to think that multilateralism will not re-emerge when the conflicts are eventually settled. In the meantime,collective action will result in an archipelago of separate projects of different shapes and sizes. It will be a fragmented order for a fragmented world.
作者簡介：Zaki La?di,Professor of International Relations atSciences Po, former adviser to former French prime minister Manuel Valls. His most recent book isLe reflux de l"Europe.
小編註：
Sciences Po：即Institut d"etudes politiques de Paris，巴黎政治大學，1871年普法戰爭結束後由埃米爾·布特米等創立的專業學院，是法國的菁英名校。法文校名「Sciences Po」，源自其舊名「巴黎自由政治學堂」（L"école Libre des Sciences Politiques），也有人認為是1945年與巴黎大學整合後的名字「巴黎大學政治科學院」（Institut d"études Politiques de Paris）的縮寫。巴黎政治大學至今共培養了29位法國和法語系國家的總統及總理（包括二戰後 8 位法國總統中的 6 位：如前總統希拉克，奧朗德和現任總統馬克龍）。著名校友還包括聯合國秘書長加利，4位國際貨幣基金組織總裁，兩位歐洲議會主席，現代奧林匹克之父顧拜旦，羅斯柴爾德家族現任掌門人金融大亨大衛·羅斯柴爾德，時尚大師克里斯汀·迪奧，當代世界文學大師馬塞爾·普魯斯特及無數跨國集團CEO等。根據QS World University Rankings 2016年的報告，其國際關係和政治專業為歐洲大陸第一（全球第四），法律和社會學為全法第二，歷史學及經濟學為全法第三及第四。巴黎政治大學、巴黎高等商業研究學院以及法國國家行政學院可以說是法國政治界及商業界領袖的三大搖籃。
小編註：
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