「對於過去我無能為力，但我永遠可以改變未來」|薩特思想詞典

Jean-Paul Sartre

1905.6.21—1980.4.15

薩特（Jean Paul Satre，1905-1980）法國哲學家、文學家、存在主義代表之一。巴黎高等師範學校畢業。1929年通過哲學教師資格考試後在巴黎和外省一些公立中學任教。1933年赴德國留學，先後在柏林大學及弗賴堡大學研究現象學，受德國胡塞爾、海德格爾等人的影響。1936年起發表小說和哲學論著。1939年應徵入伍，次年被德軍俘虜。1941年獲釋回到巴黎，繼續在中學講授哲學，同時積極投入反法西斯抵抗運動。1946年創辦政治和文學評論刊物《現代》。戰後提倡「介入現實」，成為法國存在主義思潮的主要代表人物。20世紀50年代參加左翼政治運動，1968年支持巴黎「五月風暴」學生運動。曾擔任《人民事業報》社長，《革命》月刊主編，歐洲作家聯盟主席，世界和平理事會理事，1964年謝絕接受諾貝爾文學獎，聲明「謝絕一切來自官方的榮譽」。

▌薩特（中）與波伏娃（左）會見切·格瓦拉（右）

薩特的哲學將人的存在，即人的自由作為中心加以展開。其前期思想受胡塞爾和海德格爾影響，致力於用現象學方法闡釋心理現象，對情緒、想像等心理活動與外物及現實世界的關係作了探討。提出了「現象學的本體論」，欲置身於傳統的唯物、唯心論爭之外，從「一元的現象」出發解答哲學問題。主張從一系列現象中探求存在的本質，認為顯現出來的現象必須依靠一種超現象的存在作為基礎。由於人的意識具有意向性，所以意識總是關於某物的意識，即意識總是指向對象，把對象顯現出來，對象離開意識就成為毫無價值和意義的東西，因此意識的存在就成了一切存在的意義的基礎。將存在分成兩個領域：自在存在（意識之外的實在）和自為存在（人的意識的存在），而本體論的任務是指明自為存在的本原性及其作用，即是對人的存在的基本結構及特性進行描述。

▌薩特與福柯（舉喇叭者）在街頭的人群中

指出人的存在結構就是「存在先於本質」。認為人沒有先天的客觀本性，它首先只是一種計劃和意向，是沒有實質內容的存在。人只能通過自身的不斷努力，來使計劃和意向成為現實，亦即獲得自己的本質。這就要求人必須擺脫一切外在的或自身的束縛來爭取自由，並在自由中充分展開自己的特性，即敢於對外在事物進行懷疑和否定，並對自己的命運作出選擇。人只能自己造就自己。正因為自由是人獲得本質的先決條件，所以自由就成了自為存在的根基。強調自由就是人的存在，是無法擺脫的，任何一種試圖逃避自由的行為，都是自欺欺人。薩特在強調個人自由的同時，又認為人不能脫離處境而存在，因而任何自由都是在一定處境中的自由。而且個人自由並不意味著為所欲為，人一旦獨立作出決定，他便對自己，對社會承擔起全部責任。薩特認為存在主義突出了人的獨立自主性，給予人以尊嚴，所以是一種人道主義。

▌薩特與波伏娃

在其思想演變的後期，曾讚揚馬克思主義，其論著由注重個人的獨特性轉向研究人與社會歷史的關係。他一方面稱馬克思主義是我們時代不可超越的哲學，存在主義只是寄生於其上的思想體系，另一方面則稱馬克思主義已經停滯，提出用其「人學辯證法」來補充、修正馬克思主義。他認為馬克思主義僵化的關鍵是不關心在具體環境中的個人，而存在主義則注重個人的價值和個人獨創性的實踐，是恢復了人在馬克思主義中的地位。提出以人的自由活動為內容的歷史發展哲學，即人們先是一種散漫的人，然後融和為一個集團，誓願為一個理想而集合起來，成為一種有制度制約的團體。他的這些理論被稱為「存在主義的馬克思主義」。薩特注重以文學、藝術等形式來注釋其哲學觀點，在他的小說、戲劇及文學批評中，一直貫穿著「由一個自由來重新把握世界」的精神。

▌薩特與波伏娃1955年在北京

著作

《厭惡》（La Nausée）1938年出版。是一部長篇哲理小說。以日記體寫成。主要記錄了主人公洛根丁為完成有關歷史人物研究工作，獨居布維爾城三年間所感受到的種種心態變化。書中人物大多帶有怪誕、病態的性質。該書著重描述了主人公感到他本人的存在是不能推斷出來的東西，是偶然的，無理由的，因而是荒謬的，每念及此，內心就會折騰，厭惡感隨之而來。該書實際上以文學形式對薩特現象學本體論思想及範疇做了釋義，提示了作者後來在《存在與虛無》一書中加以論證的基本內容。

《存在與虛無》（法L』être et le néant；英Being and Nothingness）副標題《現象學的本體論》。1943年出版。分序言、正文、結論。依據德國胡塞爾及海德格爾的思想，系統闡述自在存在和自為存在的現象學本體論，對意識的結構及人的各種具體狀況作了廣泛討論。正文由4卷組成。第1卷研究虛無問題，認為自為，即人的意識的存在是一種虛無，但它卻是世界萬物存在之源。第2卷探討自為的結構，指出自為以自我的形式顯露，表現為面對將來的一種計劃，伴隨著自為的出現產生了可能性、價值、時間性等問題。第3卷解說自為與他人之間一些具體的意識關係，以為每個人都想保有自己的主體性，同時又把對方當作客體，從根本上說，人與人之間必定表現為一種衝突和敵對狀態。第4卷通過對擁有、作為和存在三個概念的分析，展示人如何作出各種選擇，對「存在的精神分析法」做了說明。絕對自由說是貫穿全書的基本線索。指出人是被判定自由的，必然要永不停息地作出自由選擇，正是在這一選擇過程中，人賦予對象以意義，同時表現和造就他自身；人的種種心理情態如煩惱、自欺、羞愧、愛欲、憎恨等的含義也只有通過自由予以揭示。書中的觀點曾經薩特長期的醞釀和研究，融會了他以前散見於其小說、論著中的思想。但文體晦澀。該書問世後，被視作存在主義的重要代表作之一。

▌中文版《存在與虛無》書影

《存在主義是一種人道主義》（L』existentialismest un humanisme）系根據作者1945年在現代俱樂部的一次講演內容修改而成。1946年出版單行本。該書旨在回答針對存在主義的幾種責難。對痛苦、放任、絕望等心理體驗的含義以及「存在先於本質」等觀點作了扼要闡明。指出存在主義強調人的主觀性和自由選擇，任何一種真理和行動，皆包含人類的背景及主觀性在內。人經常超越自身，是自我設計、自我選擇的結果。個人的選擇對本人負責，也對全人類負責。由於存在主義重視人的自主決定，因而它是樂觀主義的行動哲學，又由於它結合了主觀性和超越性，給人以尊嚴，故是一種人道主義。該書被視作了解薩特存在主義哲學及其倫理觀的重要註解。

《辯證理性批判》（Critique de la raison dialectique）1960年出版第1卷。全書由引言及兩大篇組成，另附1957年發表的題為「方法問題」的長文作為獨立的序論。該書承認馬克思主義是我們時代唯一不可超越的哲學，存在主義只是寄生於上的思想體系，同時又認為當代馬克思主義患了一種「貧血症」，不再關心人，因而不再能解釋紛繁複雜的社會歷史現象。提出用存在主義的「人學」補充馬克思主義的辯證唯物主義。否認自然辯證法，主張將馬克思主義的唯物辯證法建立在個人的實踐活動的基礎上，由此建立「人學辯證法」。書中兩大篇的標題分別是：「從個人實踐到實踐-惰性」，「從集團到歷史」。對作為「任何歷史之形式要素」的個人、群體、集團之間的抽象關係作了考察，系統說明了以個人實踐為出發點和基礎的社會歷史發展學說。認為人起初出於自身需要與周圍環境打交道，結果導致自然界出現「匱乏」，人又發明工具以改造物質對象，但被人改造的物質又轉過來反對人，使人的實踐成為異己的活動。為了擺脫物的統治，人們又組成集團從事共同實踐，於是出現階級、國家、政黨等不同的集團制度形式。人創造歷史的整個過程可分別從構成的辯證法、反辯證法和被構成的辯證法這三種不同人學辯證法的層次加以分析，而歷史運動中貫穿始終的則是人的自由及其實現方式問題。薩特曾允諾在該書第2卷中結合具體歷史事實對上述理論作進一步闡發，但後來第2卷未能出版。

術語 學說

▌蒙克《繼承》

存在先於本質（英existence precedes essence）指人的存在的一種特定狀態。薩特認為，人與物不同，事物或器具的特質可以被預先確定，它們的本質先於其存在；人的存在則表現為種種可能性，經領會、籌劃、選擇獲得本身的規定性，所以他是存在先於本質。薩特在《存在主義是一種人道主義》等著作中對此作了詳盡闡述，斷言不存在設定人性範本的上帝，也不存在古典哲學倡導的普遍人性。人的生存狀態展現出來的是，首先有人，人遭逢自己，在世界上湧現出來，然後才給自己下定義。開始人一無所有，只在後來他才成為某種東西。他不僅是自己設想的人，而且是他志願成為的人。人們無法以固定的現成的人性說明人的行動，人獲得本質的過程不外是自我設計、自我造就的過程，人就是他一系列行動的總和。他實現自己有多少，他就有多少存在。該原則意味著主觀性和自由是研究人的存在的出發點，強調個人在世界上的獨特地位及自決能力。

虛無（英nothingness；法néant）指意識的特性，顯現於與自在存在的關係之中。薩特認為人在對外界的意識活動中，具有將對象虛無化的特性，即當意識指向某物時，可將某物或周圍背景虛無化，以突出事物的主要結構及關係。他又指出，帶給世界虛無化的存在自身必須是虛無化的存在，即指虛無本身（意識）不能是一個獨立的實體，它必須依賴於某個存在，虛無只能是存在的虛無。但虛無不是存在的陪襯，而是源自於存在內部的東西，它揭示了存在的缺乏。由於自在存在不能產生虛無，虛無只能源自於自為存在（意識），是意識將虛無帶進了世界。虛無概念的提出，表明意識具備特有的否定結構，在對外界的否定（虛無化）中，意識可對對象重新分化組合，使其獲得對人存在的意義。由於意識自身是一種虛無化的存在，它又具備了自我否定的結構，通過不斷否定（虛無化）自己已經是的東西，去面對不是其所是和是其所不是的東西，即否定自己已經是的過去和現在，面對尚未把握的未來。這就要求依靠自己不斷去作出選擇。薩特通過虛無概念以充分展示人的自由。薩特還指出了人面對虛無所產生的焦慮、暈眩等心態，人在這種心態中獲得了對自由的領悟。

▌蒙克《牽掛》

反思前的我思（英pre-reflective cogito）指客體與主體沒有分裂的純粹意識。薩特認為一切意識按其基本性質來說都是自我意識，即我思。我思可分為兩類，一為反思的我思，它把世界或自我作為對象，形成客體與主體的分裂。另一為反思前的我思，在這種情況下，自我沒有設定一個客觀的對象，也沒有把自身設定為對象，主體與客體還渾然一體，沒有主體與客體之間的對立。它是一種清除了客觀的認識內容，主體清除了它的對象的純粹意識。認為反思前的我思是一種原始的意識，它證明意識是非實體的、無內容的，是意識自己設定一個對象作為它自己的對象或內容。

自在存在（英being-in-itself；法être-en-soi）指人意識之外的物質性的客觀實在。與「自為存在」相對。在《存在與虛無》一書中，薩特以三個命題概括了它的特徵：存在存在著；存在是自在的；存在即是它所是的那個東西。他認為，自在存在僅是純粹的事實，沒有質的規定性。它的存在完全是偶然的，沒有原因，是無緣無故的。而且它是孤立的，不透明的，不能滲透的東西。它不與自身以外任何東西相聯繫，超乎生成變化之外，不從屬於時間。人們不可能追究它的起因，或得出什麼目的性的結論，至多只能運用同一性原則將它表述為自身的絕對等同，是一個完全充滿的東西。自在存在是引起人們所謂「噁心」感的根源。通過人的意識，自在存在構成各類對象和具體事物，並獲得了自身的意義和價值。

▌蒙克《黃色木材》

自為存在（英being-for-itself；法être-pour-soi）指人特有的存在方式，即人的意識的存在。與「自在存在」相對。薩特認為，自為存在具有特定的結構，它是沒有自身基礎的存在，它不是一個獨立的實體，不能離開某個存在而存在。它總是不斷地超越自身，超越自己的過去、現在已經是的東西而去面向未來，所以時間性是自為存在的存在方式。自為存在是由意向性活動構成，能提出問題，作出選擇和進行否定，當它指向某物時，就使對象虛無化，即重新給予對象以存在的意義。自在存在和自為存在在性質上是相對立的，但兩者又在一種綜合關係中統一起來。一方面自為存在不是自主的實體，不能脫離自在存在而獨立存在；另一方面沒有自為存在的出現，自在存在只能是一種毫無意義和價值，本身不包含任何區別的渾然一體的東西。能使自在存在和自為存在統一起來的就是自為存在本身。薩特認為人通過自為存在這一結構去面對世界和自我，以求充分展示人的自由。

▌蒙克《橋上的淑女》

為他存在（英being for other；法être pour autre）指自為存在外在化為他人的對象時的存在方式。薩特認為人在被拋入這個世界時，他不是孤立的存在，而是為事物所包圍，也為他人所包圍。由於他人的存在就打亂了自為存在的未來秩序，他人把我看成他們的對象，我不再是自為存在，成了自在存在。在這種情況下，從他人的角度來說，我就成了為他的存在，我服從於他，因而失去了我的自為性。如果我要恢復自為存在的立場，保持自由，就必然與他人發生衝突。因為自為存在總有為他存在的一方面，因而為他存在就意味著衝突的永遠存在。這種觀點使他在劇本《禁閉》中提出「他人就是地獄」。

主體間性（英intersubjectivity）指作為自為存在的人與另一作為自為存在的人的相互聯繫與和平共存。薩特在《存在與虛無》中曾提出與主體間性意義相反的「為他存在」的觀點，認為人與人之間的聯繫就是衝突。在《存在主義是一種人道主義》中提出主體間性代替為他存在，以克服人與人之間只有衝突的觀點，認為主體間性不僅是個人的，因而人在我思中不僅發現了自己，也發現了他人，他人和我自己的自我一樣真實，而且我自己的自我也是他人所認為的那個自我，因而要了解自我就要與別人接觸，通過他人來了解自己的自我，通過我影響他人來了解我自己，因而把這種人與人相聯繫的關係稱為主體間性的世界。

處境（英situation）指個人實現其自由和計劃的機會和場所。薩特認為處境是自在存在通過虛無化而自己表現出來的過程，這種過程以各種不同的形式表現出來，又為自為存在所接受。處境不是客觀的環境，它是由主觀所選擇而身臨其境的處所，但它又不是主觀的，它是在主觀的選擇中通過虛無化而選中的自身面對的東西。處境與粗陋的生存有所不同，人們選擇的處境已排除他所不選擇的東西。處境呈現於每個人生存的範圍內，不同的人的境況無法比較，他只能在他自己的境況中活動。處境的結構經常包含我的空間、我的身體、我的過去經歷、我的目前位置、我與他人的基本關係等等。這些因素的變化也引起處境的變化。

▌蒙克《星夜》

自欺（英bad faith；法mauvaise foi）指人沒有按照自己的自由行事而是按照他人行為或社會習尚行事。法文原義是「壞的相信」，其意為：按社會習尚說，其行為是誠實的；從自由的要求說，其行為是一種欺騙。認為本真的自我應是自由的，非本真的人卻總不是自由行事，表現為不顧人的超越性，而受事實性的條件的限制，隨波逐流。或者只唱超越性的調子，對自己的現狀不滿，說「我恨這樣做的我自己」。或者按照社會或他人的要求行事，把自己等同於物，為社會或他人所利用，忘記了自己的可能性與自由。

事實性（英facticity；法facticité）亦譯「散朴性」。指限制人的存在發揮其能動性的既定的東西。薩特認為人並非生存於完全為自己所選擇的境況中，自為存在總是與自在存在聯繫在一起，自為存在也總為世界以及它自己的過去所牽連，這種限制是人偶然遇到的，也是為人所不能理解的。這種事實性可以包含一個人所處的自然條件、社會背景、人的具體經歷、身份條件、財產狀況、地位高低、能力專長等。人不能規定這些事實性，而是處於事實性中。自我為事實性所設定，不能隨心所欲地否定或不理睬，也不能離開這些事實性而設計自己的可能性。認為事實性來源於自在存在的偶然性和荒謬性，但自由與事實性是互相依賴的，事實性正是自由所要去選擇或虛無化的對象，也只有通過自由的虛無化才能發現事實性。

▌蒙克《亡故》

匱乏（英scarcity；法rareté）指人們生存的過程中，自然界的物品的短缺情況。薩特認為匱乏是引起人們的實踐活動的重要原因，它使人與自然界發生關係，也產生社會的活動。認為匱乏引起人們的需求，需求不能滿足，預示著人的死亡。於是在征服自然、克服匱乏的過程中就產生了奴役人，把人當作敵人，引起人與環境、人與人之間的真正的永久性的緊張關係。認為1789年的法國大革命也是由人民生活資料的匱乏所引起，因而在匱乏的狀態下不能有人道的行為和人性化的活動。薩特以這種自然資料的匱乏來說明人們的總體化過程，並試圖以此替代馬克思主義的階級矛盾與階級鬥爭的學說。

實踐-惰性（英praxis-inert）指人與自然界之間產生的辯證關係。薩特認為實踐是個人或集團根據一定的社會條件實現自己的目的和計劃的活動，人在實踐活動中是活動的主體，是能動的創造者。惰性是物質的東西的特點，它沒有主動性，是被動的。人的活動的初期是自由的，但遇到了匱乏狀態，自由的發展就中斷了。為克服匱乏，產生了需要，匱乏與需要形成了個人的實踐，人把自己化為工具，作用於自然界，把自己外在化。通過這種實踐，使物內在化於人，這種人與物之間的關係，即內在化與外在化的過程是相互推動的，人愈是把物內在化於人，人自身也愈是外在化於物。認為這種過程是自由的異化，行動不斷超出物質，而物質又不斷地否定行動，這樣，行動不得不再超出物質，物質又否定了人的努力。認為這種實踐-惰性的辯證法使人愈來愈失去自由的自發性，受制於物質的必然性，人與物形成一種被動的無力的統一，最後物質的工具支配了人。

▌蒙克《吶喊》

總體性與總體化（英totality and totalization）指部分與全體達到綜合統一的辯證法的過程及其成果。薩特認為辯證法只適用於人的活動及歷史的發展，不適用於自然界，而辯證法的動力則是總體性。總體性表示各種現象不是孤立的單獨的出現，而是具有內在聯繫，在總體的最高統一中出現。歷史的總體性與歷史偶然性相對立，只有從歷史的總體性才能闡明歷史過程，把個別的事實歸納在發展的總匯之中。認為總體性是已經完成了的整體，是過去人們行動的消極結果，具有惰性，處於自在存在的狀況，是反辯證法的。總體化則表示進行中發展中的總體性，可以稱為總體化的總體性。認為在時間中有一種整體的展開，通過這種展開，整個歷史參與人的一切行動。一切行動都被歷史總體化，一切行動又把歷史總體化。總體化是在過去人們活動結果的基礎上的人的具體活動，它帶有自為存在的性質，是人的自為活動的表現，不帶有惰性，因而是「辯證法」的。

分析理性與辯證理性（英analytical reason and dialectical reason）指自然科學的認識方法與歷史科學的認識方法。認為自然科學的認識方法只能是分析理性，是對自然界的實證主義的分析，以數量關係的把握為主要內容，不能以之認識歷史。辯證理性是辯證法的理性活動，辯證法不涉及自然界，只涉及歷史，用以認識歷史的真理。認為辯證理性包含於歷史之中，在人的實踐活動中向人們揭示其活動。薩特在《辯證理性批判》中，從個人實踐出發，闡明由人構成辯證法引起反辯證法，即自然界對人的實踐的反動，形成被構成的辯證法，表現為歷史上的人群的活動。

▌蒙克《在蒙地卡羅的輪盤賭桌上》

融和集團（英fused group）指散漫無力的、按一定目的而形成的群眾。是集團的最初形態。薩特以1789年7月12日的巴黎民眾來說明這種集團，認為這只是把一個個孤單的個人統一起來，而且把異化融解在這個統一之中，它沒有結構，沒有一定形式，既是群的狀態，又是群的否定，它是對群起否定作用的群。認為形成融和集團的希望及因形成集團後對威脅的感受都是由各個成員自己所把握的，這個集團的全體成員都是主權者，不能形成一個總體，有時出來作為指導的成員實際上是這個全體的傀儡。認為這種集團因其散漫性，在行動目標或壓力一旦消失時，它就失去其共同的對象，重新落入實踐-惰性的領域，受物質的支配。為挽救這種集團的惰性，就要加強個人的自為的努力。

誓願集團（英pledged group）指人為了克服融和集團的散漫性，加強集團的自為性而形成的團體。薩特認為融和集團在一定的威脅不存在時就有可能消散，此時，為了鞏固集團人們就採取誓願方式，要求每一成員均宣誓忠於集團，並承認背棄誓言應受懲罰。要求成員自願接受一定的惰性，承認誓願是不可超越的東西，是自由的界限。誓願使成員放棄個人的自由而隸屬於集團的自由，使共同的個人高出於自由的個人之上。以共同的個人代替自由的個人即實現了自由平等的同胞關係，這種關係的中斷就是集團的消亡。認為誓願集團中帶有強制的恐怖的因素，同胞關係與恐怖的結合規定集團具有一種權力，因而出現了法律的權力。薩特認為在實踐-惰性的辯證法中，誓願集團的惰性成分更多一些，即對人的自由的異化更進了一步。但誓願集團的加強自為性的努力還很不夠，為了加強共同實踐的作用，需轉到制度化集團。

制度化集團（英institutionized group）指為一定的目的而形成的有組織的團體。認為它比融和集團、誓願集團更為嚴密，具有一定的目的，並為了實現這一目的而分配工作給其成員。它必須有一定的結構，其成員各有其職能。成員因為職能各不相同而具有不同的性質，他們應當發揮主動性。制度化集團的成員雖然自由的異化更多，但同時又恢復了一些發揮其主動性的自由。其個人的主動性與集團的目的相聯繫，個人實踐與共同實踐有所結合，個人實踐支持共同實踐。認為個人實踐與共同實踐是同質的，又是異質的，共同實踐常高於個人實踐。認為制度是非有機的，仍以群的散漫無力為前提，制度又要求有絕對的權力，而共同實踐只有通過個人實踐才有可能，因而它經常把對自由的異化隱蔽起來。認為制度集團既是行動又是過程，應該在行動中找到它的有機的活力，發展自己的生命，不能使自己成為機械的。但這種集團經常不斷墮入惰性狀態，自由降低，應該經常努力把多數的個人有機地組織起來，以降低惰性的影響。

▌蒙克《波西米亞婚禮》

人學辯證法（英anthropological dialectic；法dialectique anthropologique）亦稱「歷史辯證法」、「歷史人學」。薩特關於人的存在的辯證結構的理論，在《辯證理性批判》（1960）一書中作了詳盡論述。認為自然界中不存在辯證的必然性，而人的行動則具有一種先天的辯證結構。辯證法是同人的計劃、目的、選擇、手段等主觀意識活動的變化相聯繫的，它是「行動的活的邏輯」，是作為總體化的個人實踐，因而要求把辯證法確立為人學普遍適應的方法和準則。強調把握了人學辯證法也就把握了歷史運動的基本結構和規律。薩特將這一辯證法分三個階段展開：在「構成的辯證法」階段，個人基於不斷產生的需要而與周圍環境相互作用，結果導致自然界出現「匱乏」，即造成了人所需要的物品的短缺，這一階段的實踐構成了歷史過程的基礎和起點；在「反辯證法」階段，人發明了工具以改變物質匱乏，但被人改造過的物質轉而又反對人，人成了被物質支配的東西，他們只是被外在的東西統一起來，作為一種消極的，無共同利益的群集存在著；在「被構成的辯證法」階段，人們通過集團的一致行動去擺脫物的統治，以互讓互助的精神從事著共同實踐，故該階段又稱「集團實踐的辯證法」階段。「融和集團」的形態只是人們為實現某一共同目標而進行活動的手段，其本身極不穩固；在「誓願集團」的形態中，人們通過誓約有組織地分配權利和義務，對不忠實的成員實施恐怖；當發展到「制度化集團」時，集團內部產生了主權者和等級制，政黨、國家都是一種制度。隨著官僚化等惰性因素不斷滋長，個人活動的異化達到了最高程度。薩特力圖通過人學辯證法解釋歷史中的客觀必然性和人的自由問題。

▌蒙克《嫉妒》

自由選擇論（英theory of free choice）薩特關於人自主抉擇其生存命運的理論。源於他的現象學本體論，並成為其倫理觀的基石。在對自由存在，即對意識的虛無、否定的存在方式的論證中，薩特斷言自由不是人的某種性質，而是與人的結構聯繫在一起，與人的存在不可分的東西。人被拋入自由，被判定是自由的。自由並不表示一定要達到成功，或取得人慾求得到的東西，而是指人自由抉擇的自主性。它總是與一定的事實性（指社會狀況、位置、過去、工具性事物、死亡等）相關，表現為通過人的選擇去組織事實、解釋環境的意義，基於意識對事實性的作用，遂產生各種處境，自由總是處境中的自由。這種選擇自由是無條件的、持續不斷的，它的原始意義在於選擇人自己的存在，其僅有的威脅來自他人。一旦人孤身獨立作出選擇，他便對自己，對世界承擔全部責任。人傾向於尋覓某種託詞對自己隱瞞自由，但不選擇本身也是一種抉擇，人的煩惱顯示他無法避免自主決定。薩特的自由選擇論根源於人的內心世界，表現為一種抽象的「精神自由」。20世紀50~60年代，薩特對他前期的自由觀有所修改，著手探討自由的某些具體內容，如自由對物質狀況的依存性，以及在實踐活動過程中爭取自由等問題。

前進-逆溯法（英progressive-regressive method）亦譯「一往一來法」。薩特研究個人與社會歷史相互關係的方法。前進，指根據個人的計划去發現該計劃如何發展到它的客觀結果的運動，是從現在向未來的上升，著重從社會整體、一般原理出發，對個人展開活動的條件及造成的種種可能性進行演繹。逆溯，指追尋個人計劃的原始因素，是從將來回到現在，更強調對個人的行動、目的等經驗的如實把握，進而返回到圍繞著個人的各種實際關係，並解釋社會制度的作用。對個人的總體理解取決於這種不斷往複的綜合分析運動，不忽視一切異常、微觀因素，在研究中要考慮到聯繫普遍與特殊的中介性環節，如家庭等，並藉助精神分析學和社會學等學科的成果。這種探究將使社會中的個人豐富起來，同時也就深化了人們對歷史總匯的知識，達到時代和對象的雙重具體化。該方法構成薩特「存在主義的馬克思主義」的重要內容。

▌蒙克《灰燼》

An Introduction to

Jean-Paul Sartre

FromStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Sartre (1905–1980) is arguably the best known philosopher of the twentieth century. His indefatigable pursuit of philosophical reflection, literary creativity and, in the second half of his life, active political commitment gained him worldwide renown, if not admiration. He is commonly considered the father of Existentialist philosophy, whose writings set the tone for intellectual life in the decade immediately following the Second World War. Among the many ironies that permeate his life, not the least is the immense popularity of his scandalous public lecture 「Existentialism is a Humanism,」 delivered to an enthusiastic Parisian crowd October 28, 1945. Though taken as a quasi manifesto for the Existentialist movement, the transcript of this lecture was the only publication that Sartre openly regretted seeing in print. And yet it continues to be the major introduction to his philosophy for the general public. One of the reasons both for its popularity and for his discomfort is the clarity with which it exhibits the major tenets of existentialist thought while revealing Sartre"s attempt to broaden its social application in response to his Communist and Catholic critics. In other words, it offers us a glimpse of Sartre"s thought 「on the wing.」

After surveying the evolution of Sartre"s philosophical thinking, I shall address his thought under five categories, namely, ontology, psychology, ethics, political commitment, and the relation between philosophy and the fine arts, especially literature, in his work. I shall conclude with several observations about the continued relevance of his thought in contemporary philosophy both Anglo-American and 「Continental.」

▌Ontology

Like Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre distinguished ontology from metaphysics and favored the former. In his case, ontology is primarily descriptive and classificatory, whereas metaphysics purports to be causally explanatory, offering accounts about the ultimate origins and ends of individuals and of the universe as a whole. Unlike Heidegger, however, Sartre does not try to combat metaphysics as a deleterious undertaking. He simply notes in a Kantian manner that it raises questions we cannot answer. On the other hand, he subtitles Being and Nothingness a 「Phenomenological Ontology.」 Its descriptive method moves from the most abstract to the highly concrete. It begins by analyzing two distinct and irreducible categories or kinds of being: the in-itself (en-soi) and the for-itself (pour-soi), roughly the nonconscious and consciousness respectively, adding a third, the for-others (pour-autrui), later in the book. He concludes with a sketch of the practice of 「existential psychoanalysis」 that interprets our actions to uncover the fundamental project that unifies our lives.

Being-in-itself and being-for-itself have mutually exclusive characteristics and yet we (human reality) are entities that combine both, which is the ontological root of our ambiguity. The in-itself is solid, self-identical, passive and inert. It simply 「is.」 The for-itself is fluid, nonself-identical, and dynamic. It is the internal negation or 「nihilation」 of the in-itself, on which it depends. Viewed more concretely, this duality is cast as 「facticity」 and 「transcendence.」 The 「givens」 of our situation such as our language, our environment, our previous choices and our very selves in their function as in-itself constitute our facticity. As conscious individuals, we transcend (surpass) this facticity in what constitutes our 「situation.」 In other words, we are always beings 「in situation,」 but the precise mixture of transcendence and facticity that forms any situation remains indeterminable, at least while we are engaged in it. Hence Sartre concludes that we are always 「more」 than our situation and that this is the ontological foundation of our freedom. We are 「condemned」 to be free, in his hyperbolic phrase.

One can see why Sartre is often described as a Cartesian dualist but this is imprecise. Whatever dualism pervades his thought is one of spontaneity/inertia. His is not a 「two substance」 ontology like the thinking thing and the extended thing (mind and matter) of Descartes. Only the in-itself is conceivable as substance or 「thing.」 The for-itself is a no-thing, the internal negation of things. The principle of identity holds only for being-in-itself. The for-itself is an exception to this rule. Accordingly, time with all of its paradoxes is a function of the for-itself"s nihilating or 「othering」 the in-itself. The past is related to the future as in-itself to for-itself and as facticity to possibility, with the present, like 「situation」 in general, being an ambiguous mixture of both. This is Sartre"s version of Heidegger"s 「Ekstatic temporality,」 the qualitative 「lived」 time of our concerns and practices, the time that rushes by or hangs heavy on our hands, rather than the quantitative 「clock」 time that we share with physical nature.

The category or ontological principle of the for-others comes into play as soon as the other subject or Other appears on the scene. The Other cannot be deduced from the two previous principles but must be encountered. Sartre"s famous analysis of the shame one experiences at being discovered in an embarrassing situation is a phenomenological argument (what Husserl called an 「eidetic reduction」) of our awareness of another as subject. It carries the immediacy and the certainty that philosophers demand of our perception of other 「minds」 without suffering the weakness of arguments from analogy commonly used by empiricists to defend such knowledge.

The roles of consciousness and the in-itself in his earlier work are assumed by 「praxis」 (human activity in its material context) and the 「practico-inert」 respectively in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Praxis is dialectical in the Hegelian sense that it surpasses and subsumes its other, the practico-inert. The latter, like the in-itself, is inert but as 「practico-」 is the sedimentation of previous praxes. Thus speech acts would be examples of praxis but language would be practico-inert; social institutions are practico-inert but the actions they both foster and limit are praxes.

The Other in Being and Nothingness alienates or objectifies us (in this work Sartre seems to use these terms equivalently) and the third party is simply this Other writ large. The 「us」 is objectified by an Other and hence has the ontological status of being-in-itself but the collective subject or 「we,」 he insists, is simply a psychological experience. In the Critique another ontological form appears, the 「mediating」 third, that denotes the group member as such and yields a collective subject without reducing the respective agents to mere ciphers of some collective consciousness. In other words, Sartre accords an ontological primacy to individual praxis while recognizing its enrichment as group member of a praxis that sustains predicates such as command/obedience and right/duty that are properly its own. The concepts of praxis, practico-inert and mediating third form the basis of a social ontology that merits closer attention than the prolix Critique encourages.

▌Psychology

Sartre"s gifts of psychological description and analysis are widely recognized. What made him so successful a novelist and playwright contributed to the vivacity and force of his phenomenological 「arguments」 as well. His early studies of emotive and imaging consciousness in the late 1930s press the Husserlian principle of intentionality farther than their author seemed willing to go. For example, in The Psychology of Imagination (1940), Sartre argues that Husserl remains captive to the idealist principle of immanence (the object of consciousness lies within consciousness), despite his stated goal of combating idealism, when he seems to consider images as miniatures of the perceptual object reproduced or retained in the mind. On the contrary, Sartre argues, if one insists that all consciousness is intentional in nature, one must conclude that even so-called 「images」 are not objects 「in the mind」 but are ways of relating to items 「in the world」 in a properly imaginative manner, namely, by what he calls 「derealizing」 them or rendering them 「present-absent.」

It should be admitted that Sartre never read Husserl"s posthumously published lectures on the image that might have corrected his criticism. Though Husserl struggled with the notion of mental image for the first thirty years of his career and distinguished imaging consciousness Bildbewusstsein from the imagination Phantasie, he resisted any account that would employ what Sartre calls 「the principle of immanence」 and so invite an infinite regress in the vain attempt to reach the transcendent. Still Husserl continued to appeal to mental images in his account of imaging consciousness while eventually avoiding them in analyzing the imagination.

Similarly, our emotions are not 「inner states」 but are ways of relating to the world; they too are 「intentional.」 In this case, emotive behavior involves physical changes and what he calls a quasi 「magical」 attempt to transform the world by changing ourselves. The person who gets 「worked up」 when failing to hit the golf ball or to open the jar lid, is, on Sartre"s reading, 「intending」 a world where physiological changes 「conjure up」 solutions in the problematic world. The person who literally 「jumps for joy,」 to cite another of his examples, is trying by a kind of incantation to possess a good 「all at once」 that can be realized only across a temporal spread. If emotion is a joke, he warns, it is a joke we believe in. These are all spontaneous, prereflective relations. They are not the products of reflective decision. Yet insofar as they are even prereflectively conscious, we are responsible for them. And this raises the question of freedom, a necessary condition for ascribing responsibility and the heart of his philosophy.

The basis of Sartrean freedom is ontological: we are free because we are not a self (an in-itself) but a presence-to-self (the transcendence or 「nihilation」 of our self). This implies that we are 「other」 to our selves, that whatever we are or whatever others may ascribe to us, we are 「in the manner of not being it,」 that is, in the manner of being able to assume a perspective in its regard. This inner distance reflects not only the nonself-identity of the for-itself and the ekstatic temporality that it generates but forms the site of what Sartre calls 「freedom as the definition of man.」 To that freedom corresponds a coextensive responsibility. We are responsible for our 「world」 as the horizon of meaning in which we operate and thus for everything in it insofar as their meaning and value are assigned by virtue of our life-orienting fundamental 「choice.」 At this point the ontological and the psychological overlap while remaining distinct as occurs so often in phenomenology.

Such fundamental 「choice」 has been criticized as being criterionless and hence arbitrary. But it would be better to speak of it as criterion-constituting in the sense that it grounds the set of criteria on the basis of which our subsequent choices are made. It resembles what ethicist R. M. Hare calls 「decisions of principle」 (that establish the principles for subsequent decisions but are themselves unprincipled) and what Kierkegaard would describe as 「conversion.」 In fact, Sartre sometimes employed this term himself to denote a radical change in one"s basic project. It is this original sustaining 「choice」 that Existential psychoanalysis seeks to uncover.

Sartre"s use of intentionality is the backbone of his psychology. And his psychology is the key to his ontology that is being fashioned at this time. In fact, the concept of imaging consciousness as the locus of possibility, negativity and lack emerges as the model for consciousness in general (being-for-itself) in Being and Nothingness. That said, it would not be an exaggeration to describe Sartre as a philosopher of the imaginary, so important a role does imaging consciousness or its equivalent play in his work.

▌Ethics

Sartre was a moralist but scarcely a moralizer. His earliest studies, though phenomenological, underscored the freedom and by implication the responsibility of the practitioner of the phenomenological method. Thus his first major work, Transcendence of the Ego, in addition to constituting an argument against the transcendental ego (the epistemological subject that cannot be an object) central to German idealism and Hussserlian phenomenology, introduces an ethical dimension into what was traditionally an epistemological project by asserting that this appeal to a transcendental ego conceals a conscious flight from freedom. The phenomenological reduction that constitutes the objects of consciousness as pure meanings or significations devoid of the existential claims that render them liable to skeptical doubt-such a reduction or 「bracketing of the being question」 carries a moral significance as well. The 「authentic」 subject, as Sartre will later explain in his Notebooks for an Ethics, will learn to live without an ego, whether transcendental or empirical, in the sense that the transcendental ego is superfluous and the empirical ego (of scientific psychology) is an object for consciousness when it reflects on itself in an objectifying act that he calls 「accessory reflection.」 His works take pains either to ascribe moral responsibility to agents individually or collectively or to set the ontological foundations for such ascriptions.

Authenticity is achieved, Sartre claims, by a conversion that entails abandonment of our original choice to coincide with ourselves consciously (the futile desire to be in-itself-for-itself or God) and thereby free ourselves from identification with our egos as being-in-itself. In our present alienated condition, we are responsible for our egos as we are for any object of consciousness. Earlier he said that it was bad faith (self-deception)to try to coincide with our egos since the fact is that whatever we are we are in the manner of not being it due to the 「othering」 nature of consciousness. Now his mention of 「conversion」 to authenticity via a 「purifying」(non-objectifying) reflection elaborates that authentic project. He insists that we must allow our spontaneous 「selfness」 (what he terms ipseity here and in Being and Nothingness) to replace the 「Me」 or Ego, which he criticizes as an 「abusive intermediary」 whose future prefigures my future. The shift is from relations of 「appropriation」 or being where I focus on identifying with my ego in a bad-faith flight from freedom,to relations of 「existence」 and autonomy where I attend entirely to my project and its goal. The former is egoistic, Sartre now implies, where the latter is outgoing and generous. This resonates with what he will say about the creative artist"s work as a gift, an appeal to another freedom and an act of generosity.

It is now common to distinguish three distinct ethical positions in Sartre"s writings. The first and best known, existentialist ethics is one of disalienation and authenticity. It assumes that we live in a society of oppression and exploitation. The former is primary and personal, the latter structural and impersonal. While he enters into extended polemics in various essays and journal articles of the late 1940s and 『50s concerning the systematic exploitation of people in capitalist and colonialist institutions, Sartre always sought a way to bring the responsibility home to individuals who could in principle be named. As Merleau-Ponty observed, Sartre stressed oppression over exploitation, individual moral responsibility over structural causation but without denying the importance of the latter. In fact, as his concept of freedom thickened from the ontological to the social and historical in the mid 『40s, his appreciation of the influence of factical conditions in the exercise of freedom grew apace.

Sartre"s concept of authenticity, occasionally cited as the only existentialist 「virtue,」 is often criticized as denoting more a style than a content. Admittedly, it does seem compatible with a wide variety of life choices. Its foundation, again, is ontological-the basic ambiguity of human reality that 「is what it is not」 (that is, its future as possibility) and 「is not what it is」 (its past as facticity, including its ego or self, to which we have seen it is related via an internal negation). We could say that authenticity is fundamentally living this ontological truth of one"s situation, namely, that one is never identical with one"s current state but remains responsible for sustaining it. Thus, the claim 「that"s just the way I am」 would constitute a form of self-deception or bad faith as would all forms of determinism, since both instances involve lying to oneself about the ontological fact of one"s nonself-coincidence and the flight from concomitant responsibility for 「choosing」 to remain that way.

Given the fundamental division of the human situation into facticity and transcendence, bad faith or inauthenticity can assume two principal forms: one that denies the freedom or transcendence component (「I can"t do anything about it」) and the other that ignores the factical dimension of every situation (「I can do anything by just wishing it」). The former is the more prevalent form of self deception but the latter is common to people who lack a sense of the real in their lives.

Sartre sometimes talks as if any choice could be authentic so long as it is lived with a clear awareness of its contingency and responsibility. But his considered opinion excludes choices that oppress or consciously exploit others. In other words, authenticity is not entirely style; there is a general content and that content is freedom. Thus the 「authentic Nazi」 is explicitly disqualified as being oxymoronic. Sartre"s thesis is that freedom is the implicit object of any choice, a claim he makes but does not adequately defend in his Humanism lecture. He seems to assume that 「freedom」 is the aspect under which any choice is made, its 「formal object,」 to revive an ancient term. But a stronger argument than that would be required to disqualify an 「authentic」 Nazi.

Though critical of its bourgeois variety, Sartre does support an existentialist humanism, the motto of which could well be his remark that 「you can always make something out of what you"ve been made into」 (Situations 9:101). In fact, his entire career could be summarized in these words that carry an ethical as well as a critical message. The first part of his professional life focused on the freedom of the existential individual (you can always make something out of…); the second concentrated on the socioeconomic and historical conditions which limited and modified that freedom (what you"ve been made into), once freedom ceased to be merely the definition of 「man」 and included the possibility of genuine options in concrete situations. That phase corresponded to Sartre"s political commitment and active involvement in public debates, always in search of the exploitative 「systems」 such as capitalism, colonialism and racism at work in society and the oppressive practices of individuals who sustained them. As he grew more cognizant of the social dimension of individual life, the political and the ethical tended to coalesce. In fact, he explicitly rejected 「Machiavellianism.」

If Sartre"s first and best known ethics corresponds to the ontology of Being and Nothingness, his second, 「dialectical」 ethics builds on the philosophy of history developed in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. In a series of posthumously published notes for lectures in the 1960s, some of which were never delivered, Sartre sketched a theory of ethics based on the concepts of human need and the ideal of 「integral man」 in contrast with its counter-concept, the 「subhuman.」What this adds to his published ethics is a more specific content and a keener sense of the social conditions for living a properly human life.

Sartre"s third attempt at an ethics, which he called an ethics of the 「we,」 was undertaken in interview format with his secretary, Benny Lévy, toward the end of his life. It purports to question many of the main propositions of his ethics of authenticity, yet what has appeared in print chiefly elaborates claims already stated in his earlier works. But since the tapes on which these remarks were recorded are unavailable to the public and Sartre"s illness at the time they were made was serious, their authority as revisionary of his general philosophy remains doubtful. If ever released in its entirety, this text will constitute a serious hermeneutical challenge.

▌Politics

Sartre was not politically involved in the 1930s though his heart, as he said, 「was on the left, like everyone"s.」 The War years, occupation and resistance made the difference. He emerged committed to social reform and convinced that the writer had the obligation to address the social issues of the day. He founded the influential journal of opinion, Les Temps modernes, with his partner Simone de Beauvoir, as well as Merleau-Ponty, Raymond Aron and others. In the 「Présentation」 to the initial issue (October, 1945), he elaborated his idea of committed literature and insisted that failure to address political issues amounted to supporting the status quo. After a brief unsuccessful attempt to help organize a nonCommunist leftist political organization, he began his long love-hate relationship with the French Communist Party, which he never joined but which for years he considered the legitimate voice of the working class in France. This continued till the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956. Still, Sartre continued to sympathize with the movement, if not the Party, for some time afterwards. He summarized his disillusionment in an essay 「The Communists are afraid of Revolution,」 following the 「events of May,」 1968. By then he had moved toward the radical Left and what the French labeled 「les Maos,」 whom he likewise never joined but whose mixture of the ethical and the political attracted him.

Politically, Sartre tended toward what the French call 「libertarian socialism,」 which is a kind of anarchism. Ever distrustful of authority, which he considered 「the Other in us,」 his ideal was a society of voluntary eye-level relations that he called 「the city of ends.」 One caught a glimpse of this in his description of the forming group (le groupe en fusion) in the Critique. There each was 「the same」 as the others in terms of practical concern. Each suspended his or her personal interests for the sake of the common goal. No doubt these practices hardened into institutions and freedom was compromised once more in bureaucratic machinery. But that brief taste of genuine positive reciprocity was revelatory of what an authentic social existence could be.

Sartre came to recognize how the economic conditions the political in the sense that material scarcity, as both Ricardo and Marx insisted, determines our social relations. In Sartre"s reading, scarcity emerges as the source of structural and personal violence in human history as we know it. It follows, he believes, that liberation from such violence will come only through the counter violence of revolution and the advent of a 「socialism of abundance.」

What Sartre termed the 「progressive/regressive method」 for historical investigation is a hybrid of historical materialism and existentialist psychoanalysis. It respects the often decisive role of economic considerations in historical explanation (historical materialism) while insisting that 「the men that History makes are not the men that make history」; in other words, he resists complete economic determinism by implicit appeal to his humanist motto: 「You can always make something out of…」

Never one to avoid a battle, Sartre became embroiled in the Algerian War, generating deep hostility from the Right to the point that a bomb was detonated at the entrance to his apartment building on two occasions by supporters of a French Algeria. Sartre"s political critique conveyed in a series of essays, interviews and plays, especially The Condemned of Altona, once more combined a sense of structural exploitation (in this case, the institution of colonialism and its attendant racism) with an expression of moral outrage at the oppression of the Muslim population and the torture of captives by the French military.

Mention of the play reminds us of the role of imaginative art in Sartre"s philosophical work. This piece, whose chief protagonist is Frantz 「the butcher of Smolensk,」 though ostensibly about the effect of Nazi atrocities at the Eastern front on a postwar industrialist family in Hamburg, is really addressing the question of collective guilt and the French suppression of the Algerian war for independence raging at that time. Sartre often turned to literary art to convey or even to work through philosophical thoughts that he had already or would later conceptualize in his essays and theoretical studies. Which brings us to the relation between imaginative literature and philosophy in his work.

▌Art and Philosophy

The strategy of 「indirect communication」 has been an instrument of 「Existentialists」 since Kierkegaard adopted the use of pseudonyms in his philosophical writings in the early nineteenth century. The point is to communicate a feeling and an attitude that the reader/spectator adopts in which certain existentialist themes such as anguish, responsibility or bad faith are suggested but not dictated as in a lecture. Asked why his plays were performed only in the bourgeois sections of the city, Sartre replied that no bourgeois could leave a performance of one of them without 「thinking thoughts traitorous to his class.」 The so-called aesthetic 「suspension of disbelief」 coupled with the tendency to identify with certain characters and to experience their plight vicariously conveys conviction rather than information. And this is what existentialism is chiefly about: challenging the individual to examine their life for intimations of bad faith and to heighten their sensitivity to oppression and exploitation in their world.

Sartre"s early work Nausea (1938) is the very model of a philosophical novel. Its protagonist, Roquentin, works through many of the major themes of Being and Nothingness that will appear five years later. It can be read as an extended meditation on the contingency of our existence and on the psychosomatic experience that captures that phenomenon. In his famous meditation on a tree root, Roquentin experiences the brute facticity of its existence and of his own: both are simply there, without justification, in excess (de trop). The physicality of this revelatory 「sickly sweet」 sensation should not be overlooked. Like the embarrassment felt before the Other"s gaze in the voyeur example cited earlier, our bodily intentionality (what he calls 「the body as for-itself」) is revealing an ontological reality.

The case at hand is an artistic way of conveying what Sartre in Being and Nothingness will call 「the phenomenon of being.」 He agrees with the tradition that 「being」 or 「to be」 is not a concept. But if not that, how is it to be indexed? What does it mean 「to be」? Sartre"s existential phenomenology appeals to certain kinds of experience such as nausea and joy to articulate the 「transphenomenal」 character of being. Pace Kant, 「being」 does not denote a realm behind the phenomena that the descriptive method analyzes. Neither is it the object of an 「eidetic」 reduction (the phenomenological method that would grasp it as an essence). Rather, being accompanies all phenomena as their existential dimension. But this dimension is revealed by certain experiences such as that of the utter contingency which Roquentin felt. This is scarcely rationalism, but neither is it mysticism. Anyone can experience this contingency and, once brought to reflective awareness, can ponder its implications. What this novel does imaginatively, Being and Nothingness, subtitled 「A Phenomenological Ontology,」 pursues conceptually, though with the aid of phenomenological 「arguments,」 as we have seen.

In a series of essays published as What is Literature? (1947), Sartre expounds his notion of 「committed」 literature, a turn in his thought first indicated in the inaugural issue of Les Temps modernes two years earlier. Though steeped in the polemics of the day, this continues to be a seminal text of criticism. It underscores what I have called the 「pragmatist」 dimension of Sartre"s thought: writing is a form of acting in the world; it produces effects for which the author must assume responsibility. Addressing the problem of 「writing for our time,」 Sartre underscores the harsh facts of oppression and exploitation that were not erased by the upheaval of world war. Ours remains 「a society based on violence.」 Accordingly, the author is responsible for addressing that violence with a counter-violence (for example, by his choice of topics to discuss) or sharing in it by his silence. Drawing a distinction between prose, which can be committed, and 「poetry」 (basically nonrepresentational art such as music and poetry properly speaking), which cannot—a distinction that will return to haunt him—Sartre proceeds to urge that the prose-writer reveal that man is a value to be invented each day and that 「the questions he raises are always moral」 (203). A clear rejection of 「art for art"s sake,」 Sartre insisted on the social responsibility of the artist and the intellectual in general.

The artwork, for Sartre, has always carried a special power: that of communicating among freedoms without alienation or objectification. In this sense, it has stood as an exception to the objectifying gaze of his vintage existentialist texts. That relation between artist and public via the work of art Sartre calls 「gift-appeal.」 In his The Imaginary, he speaks of the portrait 「inviting」 the viewer to realize its possibilities by regarding it aesthetically. By the time he gathers these thoughts in What is Literature? and Notebooks for an Ethics, the concept of writing as an act of generosity to which the reader responds by an act of 「re-creation」 that respects the mutuality of these freedoms—this gift/response model assumes political significance. It is offered as an example of positive reciprocity in the political realm. And, in fact, it anticipates the 「free alterity」 of the group member as analyzed in the Critique. In other words, Sartre"s political and ethical values and concerns conjoin in the concept of committed literature.

Before concluding with a prognosis of Sartre"s philosophical relevance in the twenty-first century, let me note the several 「biographies」 that he produced of important literary figures in addition to his autobiography, Words. Each of these studies constitutes a form of existential psychoanalysis. The subject"s literary production is submitted to a kind of 「hermeneutic」 in which the underlying life-project is uncovered. He begins to employ the progressive-regressive method in the late 『50s whereby the historical and socioeconomic conditions of the subject are uncovered in a 「regressive」 argument from biographical and social facts to the conditions of their possibility followed by a 「progressive」 account of the subjects process of 「personalization.」 The most extensive, if not the most successful, of these 「biographies」 is his analysis of the life and times of Gustave Flaubert, The Family Idiot.

But these biographies, almost exclusively about literary men, are also object lessons in an 「existentialist」 theory of history. Their hallmark is an attempt to reconstruct the subject"s project as his manner of dialectically 「totalizing」 his epoch even as he is being totalized by it. While connecting impersonal historical phenomena in their dialectical necessity (for example, the unintended consequences ingredient in any historical account), these narratives are intent on conveying the subject"s sense of the anguish of decision and the pinch of the real. In effect, biography is an essential part of an existentialist approach to history and not a mere illustrative appendage.

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