始終在做取捨的選擇題：匯率有管理浮動的中國樣本

中國外匯

ID:china-forex

始終在做取捨的選擇題：匯率有管理浮動的中國樣本

Exchange Rate Choices and China』s Managed Float

文/管濤 翻譯/魏凌波（中國外匯）

1994年初，人民幣官方匯率與外匯調劑市場匯率並軌，確立了以市場供求為基礎的、有管理的浮動匯率制度。匯率「中間解」的中國實踐與探索，讓要麼完全固定、要麼自由浮動（即匯率「兩極解」或「角點解」）的匯率「中空理論」黯然失色。梳理二十多年來有管理浮動框架下的人民幣匯率機制改革，市場化是既定方向，匯率政策操作則無時無刻不是在做有舍才有得的選擇題。

In early 1994, the renminbi"s official exchange rate was merged with the exchange rate of the foreign exchange adjustment market, thereby establishing a single managed float system based on market supply and demand. China』s experience stands in contrast to a completely fixed exchange rate or a completely free-floating exchange rate. After reviewing the exchange rate reforms of the past two decades or so, it is clear that a market-based exchange rate is the general objective and exchange rate policy is always about selecting the appropriate approach at the appropriate time.

關於最優的匯率選擇（包括匯率制度和匯率政策），一直是國際金融領域最有爭議的話題。基本共識是，無論匯率固定、浮動還是有管理浮動，各有利弊，沒有一種匯率選擇是適合所有國家以及一個國家所有時期的。對於政府來講，匯率選擇是排他的，選擇了有管理浮動，就意味著放棄了匯率固定和自由浮動可能帶來的好處。後者就是有管理浮動的成本，成為政府被批評的原因。

There has long been much controversy over what constitutes the best exchange rate system and what policies should be applied. The general consensus is that there are advantages and disadvantages to both fixed and floating rate systems. No system fits all countries — or even certain countries — all of the time. For the government, a managed floating exchange rate system means foregoing the benefits of the fixed exchange rate or the free-floating exchange rate. At the same time, the government has been criticized for the cost of maintaining a managed float exchange rate.

過去二十多年來，在有管理浮動的匯率制度框架下，中國就是在爭論聲中進行匯率政策選擇和匯率機制改革。比如亞洲金融危機期間，亞洲貨幣大幅貶值，人民幣也面臨較強的貶值壓力。當時，西方禍水東引，將危機歸咎為1994年初人民幣匯率的率先調整。為反擊西方的詆毀並體現大國的擔當，也為國內金融穩定計，中國選擇了「人民幣不貶值」，將人民幣兌美元匯率基本穩定在8.28左右的水平。這避免了競爭性貶值，阻止了信心危機傳染，為維護亞洲乃至全球金融穩定做出了重要貢獻。然而，期間，人民幣隨美元對其他主要貿易夥伴貨幣升值，則增加了中國出口企業的困難，加劇了國內通貨緊縮趨勢。顯然，「人民幣不貶值」並非唯一解，也不是無痛解。但最終取得成功，使得之前的一切付出都是值得的——「人民幣不貶值」就是正確的政策。

Over the past two decades, China has set various policies under the framework of a managed float, and there has been no shortage of controversy. During the Asian financial crisis, when Asian currencies depreciated sharply and the renminbi faced strong downward pressure, the West unfairly accused China of setting the stage for the crisis with its first adjustment of the renminbi exchange rate in early 1994. In order to counter this argument while safeguarding domestic financial stability and shouldering some of the responsibility of a world economic power, China chose to prevent the renminbi from depreciating. It held the currency stable at around 8.28 to one US dollar. This avoided further competitive devaluations, making an important contribution to financial stability in Asia and the rest of the world. However, eventually an appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar and other currencies increased difficulties for Chinese exporters, which aggravated the nation"s domestic deflationary trend. Obviously, holding the renminbi steady was the correct policy choice but it came at a price.

2015年「8·11」匯改後，中國再次面臨資本外流、人民幣貶值的壓力。這次，中國選擇了堅持有管理的浮動，讓人民幣參考籃子貨幣匯率走勢上下波動。這在一定程度上釋放了前期隨美元被動升值造成的人民幣幣值高估的壓力，促進了人民幣匯率水平趨向均衡合理。但此舉也帶來了一定的挑戰：由於境外美元持續走強，境內人民幣兌美元匯率不斷下跌，造成了市場恐慌，加速了資本外流。到2016年底，當人民幣匯率距「破七」、外匯儲備離三萬億僅一步之遙時，國內掀起了保匯率還是保儲備之爭。

After the August 11, 2015 exchange rate reform, which effectively devalued the renminbi, China once again faced pressure from capital outflows. At that point, China opted for a managed floating exchange rate, allowing the renminbi to trade in accordance with market supply and demand but with a reference to a basket of currencies. To a certain extent, this eased pressure from an overvalued renminbi due to the past appreciation of the US dollar. It promoted a balanced and reasonable exchange rate for the renminbi, although it brought about certain challenges. As the US dollar continued to strengthen in the offshore market, the renminbi』s exchange rate against the dollar continued to fall on the domestic market. This led to market panic and an acceleration of capital outflows. By the end of 2016, the renminbi exchange rate had weakened beyond seven to the dollar and the nation』s foreign exchange reserves had slipped to only a shade more than US$3 trillion. That prompted heated policy debates over whether to maintain stability in the exchange rate or stabilize foreign reserves.

誠然，這次堅持有管理的浮動確實暴露了一系列問題，但其他匯率選擇又何嘗沒有風險？如果前期選擇匯率一浮到底，人民幣過度貶值將會是大概率事件，且在經濟企穩之前，人民幣匯率難言底部。而且，人民幣貶值可能還會引起國際上的競爭性貶值，招致更多的對華貿易保護主義，並可能會觸發國內恐慌性購匯，威脅銀行體系安全，以及其他不可預見的風險。

The insistence on maintaining a managed floating exchange rate revealed a series of problems. But were there no risks in other exchange rate choices? Had the currency been allowed to float in the early stages, a very sharp depreciation would have been highly likely. Before the economy stabilized, it was difficult to predict when the renminbi exchange rate would touch bottom. Moreover, renminbi depreciation would have led to competitive devaluations, incurring more trade protectionism against China. That in turn would have triggered panic buying of foreign exchange on the home market, threatening the security of the banking system and causing other unforeseen risks.

結論：匯率選擇沒有一勞永逸的最優解，關鍵是目標要儘早確定，確定以後，手段和工具要與目標相匹配。無論選擇何種匯率制度或政策，都不要輕言利大於弊、風險可控，而是針對每種選擇可能引致的風險，在情景分析、壓力測試的基礎上做好應對預案，有備無患。

There is no perfect solution to the exchange rate problem. The key is determining the target as soon as possible. In addition, the tools must match the target. We should not hastily conclude that advantages outweigh disadvantages or that risks are always controllable. Instead, it is necessary to focus on the risks that each option may present, by preparing the corresponding plans on the basis of scenario analysis and stress testing.

當外匯供求失衡時，在外匯政策方面，要麼是價格出清，讓匯率升值或者貶值；要麼是數量出清，動用外匯儲備干預或者加強資本流動管理。現實中，不可能既要保匯率，又要保儲備，還要跨境資本繼續自由流動。筆者稱之為外匯政策的「不可能三角」。

It is impossible to extract only the advantages when dealing with the impact of capital flows. When there is an imbalance of supply and demand on the foreign exchange market, it is necessary to let the currency appreciate or depreciate, and it may be necessary to use foreign exchange reserves to intervene in the market or strengthen capital flow management. In reality, it is impossible to maintain the exchange rate as well as reserves, and to continue the free cross-border flow of capital at the same time. The author calls this the "impossible triangle of foreign exchange policy."

亞洲金融危機期間，中國選擇了人民幣不貶值，同時又不想消耗外匯儲備來維持匯率穩定，所以，主要是通過加強和改進外匯管理來應對資本流出，包括打擊出口逃匯和進口騙匯，限制資本項目用匯等。

During the Asian financial crisis, China chose not to depreciate the renminbi, and not to use up foreign exchange reserves to maintain exchange rate stability. Instead, it dealt with potential capital outflows by strengthening and improving foreign exchange management, including cracking down on under-reporting of exports and import fraud, as well as limiting the use of foreign exchange under the capital account.

2005年「7·21」匯改，人民幣匯率重歸有管理的浮動後，中國採取了以下措施應對資本流入衝擊：一是保持人民幣匯率在合理均衡水平上的基本穩定，最終人民幣兌美元匯率漸進升值；二是按照「池子理論」積累外匯儲備，吸收過度流入的資本，在2006年底明確不追求外匯儲備越多越好以後，依然增持了近3萬億美元的外匯儲備；三是按照「控流入、擴流出」的思路，加強和改進資本流動管理。

After the exchange reform of July 21, 2005 and the return of the renminbi exchange rate system to a managed floating rate, China adopted the following measures to deal with the impact of capital inflows. First, it worked to maintain the basic stability of the renminbi at a reasonable and balanced level. Eventually, the renminbi exchange rate against the US dollar began to improve gradually. Second, China worked to accumulate foreign exchange reserves in accordance with the pool theory by absorbing excess capital inflows. At the end of 2006, after making clear that China did not aim to pursue endless increases in its foreign exchange holdings, reserves still reached nearly US$3 trillion. The idea of controlling capital inflows and stepping up outflows gained support and this improved capital flow management.

2014年二季度起，特別是「8·11」匯改以後，中國遭遇了一波持續時間較長的資本集中流出。這一次，中國也是「三管齊下」。因為早已判斷外匯儲備比較充裕，起初主要是用儲備干預的方式來平抑外匯供求缺口。「8·11」匯改後，開始發揮匯率調節的作用，讓人民幣匯率參考一籃子貨幣調節，隨美元指數變化而對美元反向波動。當儲備干預和匯率調節均不足以出清市場後，則開始調整資本流動管理政策。尤其是2016年底，階段性地加強資本流出管理，為改革和調整爭取了時間。2017年，企業對外投資回歸理性，經常項目與直接投資順差合計（即基礎國際收支順差）重新大於短期資本外流規模；剔除估值影響後的外匯儲備也止跌回升，化解了資本流動衝擊的風險，維護了國家金融安全。

Since the second quarter of 2014, and especially after the 2015 exchange reform, China experienced a long period of capital outflows. In response, China adopted a three-pronged approach. Because it had long been judged that China had sufficient foreign exchange reserves, the reserves were used as an intervention tool to bridge the gap between foreign exchange supply and demand. After the 2015 reform, market adjustments took on a bigger role, though there was a reference to a basket of currencies. The currency fluctuated inversely against the US dollar as the dollar index changed. When both the intervention and the exchange rate adjustment were not sufficient to reorder the market, China began to adjust its capital flow management policies. Especially in late 2016, the management of capital outflows was strengthened step by step, and in the process more time was gained for reform. In 2017, overseas investments of enterprises became more rational and there was a total surplus from the current account and direct investment. Foreign exchange reserves, adjusted for valuation changes, were no longer falling. This resolved the risks from capital flows, which safeguarded China』s national financial security.

結論：匯率調節、儲備干預和資本管理三個工具沒有絕對的好壞，關鍵是要排出政策目標的優先次序，做出政策工具的取捨。當然，資本流動管理要講求藝術和技巧，遵守國際規則和義務。同時，管理只是爭取時間，不能替代必要的改革和調整，有些管理應該是臨時性措施，形勢好轉後宜適時撤出，回歸政策中性。

The three policy instruments of exchange rate adjustment, reserve intervention and capital management are neither intrinsically good nor bad. The key is to make policy objectives clear and thus select the appropriate policy tools. Certainly, it is imperative that we pay attention to the details in managing capital flows and meet our international obligations. Meanwhile, exchange rate management buys time for reforms, but it should not be seen as a substitute for reform. Some management measures must be temporary. When the situation improves, these measures should be withdrawn in a timely manner. And that is when China should return to policy neutrality.

可信度是匯率政策成功的關鍵

Credibility - the Key to Success

「8·11」匯改後，人民幣匯率堅持有管理的浮動。為解決透明度問題，外匯市場自律機制秘書處披露了匯率中間價的報價機制。此舉改善了央行與市場之間的溝通。2016年下半年，當人民幣兌美元震蕩下跌時，並沒有像前兩次那樣產生負面衝擊。因為市場理解，人民幣貶值是因為美元太強，而非貨幣戰爭。但因境內近90%的跨境外幣收付都是美元，人民幣兌美元匯率較大幅度的下跌也觸及了「中間解」的公信力問題，引發了當時市場上較強的人民幣看空情緒。

After the 2015 exchange reform, the mechanics of the mid-price quotation mechanism were disclosed in a move to boost transparency. This improved communication between the central bank and the market, and there were clear benefits as a result. In the second half of 2016, for example, when the renminbi fell against the US dollar, the negative impact on sentiment was less pronounced than in the past. The market understood that the weakening of the renminbi was due to a strong US dollar instead of a "currency war." Nevertheless, because nearly 90% of China』s cross-border foreign currency payments were in US dollars, the significant decline in the exchange rate still had an impact on sentiment.

2017年人民幣匯率維穩取得超預期成功，關鍵在於重塑了政府市場信譽。5月底，在中間價報價機制中引入「逆周期因子」，以對沖外匯市場的順周期行為和更好地反映國內經濟基本面，拿回了匯率調控的主動權。全年在市場總體看空人民幣、外匯依然供不應求的情況下，借著國內經濟企穩、美元意外走弱，人民幣兌美元升值6%以上，完爆了看空、做空人民幣的勢力。同期，企業結匯大幅增加、購匯基本持平，外匯供求趨於平衡。與此同時，保儲備目標也順利達成。因為不論保匯率還是保儲備，都不是保具體水平或規模，而是保信心。信心問題解決了，匯率就穩住了，儲備也就保住了。

The key to successfully maintaining the stability of the renminbi exchange rate in 2017 was to reshape the credibility of the government role in the market. At the end of May, the counter-cyclical factor was introduced into the mid-price quotation mechanism to offset pro-cyclical behavior of the foreign exchange market. This was done to better reflect domestic economic fundamentals and take the initiative in determining exchange rate direction. In the context of the market betting on renminbi weakness and with foreign exchange in short supply, with the stabilizing domestic economy and the unexpectedly weaker US dollar, the renminbi actually appreciated by more than 6% against the US currency. During the same period, foreign exchange settlements by enterprises increased substantially, purchases of foreign exchange remained basically stable, and foreign exchange supply and demand were largely in balance. At the same time, the goal of securing foreign reserves was successfully achieved. Whether to maintain the exchange rate or maintain foreign reserves, it was necessary to maintain confidence rather than target specific levels for the exchange rate or in the size of foreign exchange reserves. With the problem of confidence solved and the exchange rate stabilized, the nation"s foreign reserves were protected.

結論：可信度對於匯率政策的成功至關重要。穩定市場預期和信心，不僅要靠市場溝通，還要靠市場操作，並輔之以可信的價格信號，資本流動管理的有效性才會有保障。

This shows that credibility is the key to successful exchange rate policies. Stabilizing market confidence and expectations relies on communication as well as market operations. Credible price signals are in order to ensure the effectiveness of capital flow management.

匯率改革無所謂最佳時機

All in the Timing

理論上，形勢好的時候，匯率改革的風險相對較小；形勢差的時候，改革的風險相對較大。但從過去二十多年的中國實踐看，所謂最佳時機可能是個值得商榷的話題。

There is no 「best time」 for exchange rate reform. In theory, when the market situation is good, the risks of exchange rate reform are relatively small; when the market situation is poor, the risks are greater. However, judging from the experience of the past two decades, the so-called 「best time」 for such reforms requires more discussion.

比如說，1994年匯率並軌的改革，就是在國內經濟過熱、貿易赤字較大、貶值預期較強的不利情況下啟動的。當時，基本認為「匯率穩定、儲備增加」是不可能完成的任務。然而，由於宏觀調控到位、改革設計周全，全年超預期地實現了改革目標，人民幣從此由弱轉強，外匯儲備節節攀升。

For example, the 1994 currency reform was initiated under the unfavorable conditions of an overheated domestic economy and strong expectations of renminbi depreciation. At that time, it was widely believed that the goals of stabilizing the exchange rate and increasing foreign reserves could not be reached at the same time. However, due to the successful macroeconomic controls and the comprehensive reforms, the reform goals were achieved beyond expectations. The renminbi shifted from weakness to strength, and foreign exchange reserves rose steadily.

再比如說，2011年底受歐美主權債務危機衝擊的影響，中國出現了少有的資本凈流出局面。當年12月份，境內銀行間外匯市場上人民幣兌美元交易價一度連續跌停，香港市場的人民幣購售額度首次告罄。但是，中國抓住經常項目順差、資本項目逆差，國際收支趨於基本平衡，市場預期分化的時機，於2012年4月順勢擴大了人民幣匯率日浮動區間，引入了銀行結售匯綜合頭寸正負區間管理。當年，央行基本退出了外匯市場常態干預，人民幣匯率實現了雙向波動，外匯供求趨向基本平衡。

In another example, at the end of 2011, due to the impact of debt problems in Europe and the US, China experienced a rare situation of net capital outflows. In December of that year, the domestic market price of the renminbi against the dollar fell continuously. For the first time, the quota for renminbi purchases and sales in the Hong Kong market was used up. However, with a current account surplus and a capital account deficit, there was a basic balance in China"s international payments. Market expectations for the nation』s currency were divided. In April of 2012, authorities took advantage of the situation to expand the permitted daily trading range of the renminbi. They introduced a management tool of assessing a bank』s overall foreign exchange purchases and settlements. The central bank largely withdrew from routine foreign exchange market intervention and the renminbi exchange rate showed a pattern of two-way trading. Foreign exchange supply and demand tended to become basically balanced.

對於2015年「8·11」匯改的時機則充滿爭議。有一派觀點認為，當時中國剛剛遭遇股市異動，外匯市場再現動蕩，加劇了市場恐慌。但鑒於當時並不知道促成資本流動逆轉的國內經濟下行和外部美元走強等因素會持續多長時間，且國內股市異動和美聯儲加息預期還有可能使上述利空人民幣的因素不斷強化，所以，當局考慮進行匯率機制調整並非是一時衝動。如果不動匯率的話，一方面要繼續大幅消耗外匯儲備，進一步打擊市場信心；另一方面，交易價繼續相對中間價較大的偏離，還會影響到中間價的基準地位。屆時，政府同樣需要處理一系列棘手的問題。

The timing of the exchange reform in August 2015 was highly controversial. One school of thought contended that at that time China had suffered an unexpected setback on the stock market and the foreign exchange market was in turmoil. Why exacerbate market fears? However, it was unclear at the time how long the domestic economic downturn would last, whether capital inflows would revive or whether the US dollar would continue to strengthen. If domestic stock prices continued to slide and expectations of further US interest rate hikes prevailed, the negative sentiment might worsen. The adjustment of the exchange rate mechanism was therefore not an impulsive act by authorities. Without reforming the exchange rate mechanism, authorities would have needed to use a large amount of foreign exchange reserves to stabilize the exchange rate. At the same time, market prices would have continued to deviate sharply from the renminbi mid-price, and that in itself would have affected the benchmark position of the mid-price. The government would have had a series of difficult policy issues to address.

結論：改革的最佳時機只是理想中的概念。改革就是改變，改變就是不確定，不確定就是風險。所以，任何改革都要從最壞處打算爭取最好的結果。另外，機會總是留給有準備的人。「7·21」匯改實際從2001年起就開始醞釀，只是由於各種因素而被一再延遲。但期間，中國實施了國有獨資商業銀行的股份制改革，加上宏觀經濟環境好轉，「7·21」匯改雖然出其不意卻也是水到渠成。

This suggests that the 「best time」 for reform is merely an ideal concept. Reform means change, change means uncertainty, and uncertainty means risk. Any reform must aim at the best results possible and the avoidance of the worst-case scenario. Moreover, opportunities arise for those who are prepared. Preparations for the exchange reform of July 21, 2005 had actually begun in 2001 but implementation was repeatedly delayed. During the period, however, China implemented its joint-stock reform of the wholly state-owned commercial banks. Helped by the improvement in the macroeconomic environment, the 2005 exchange rate reform was a surprising success.

經常項目收支失衡和人民幣匯率問題曾經是中美貿易爭端的焦點。但是，2005年匯改以來，人民幣雙邊和多邊匯率大幅升值，促進了中國經濟再平衡，經常項目順差與GDP之比大幅收斂。2012年起，國際貨幣基金組織不再認為人民幣匯率存在顯著低估。近年來，美國財政部也不再威脅給中國貼上「貨幣操縱」的標籤，施壓人民幣匯率重估。

It is also necessary to have an objective understanding of the role of exchange rate adjustment in international payments. The current account imbalances and the renminbi exchange rate were once the focus of Sino-US trade disputes. However, since the exchange rate reform of 2005, the renminbi has appreciated significantly against most currencies. This has promoted the rebalancing of China』s economy and helped reduce the size of the current account surplus as a percentage of gross domestic products. Since 2012, the International Monetary Fund has no longer considered the renminbi exchange rate to be significantly undervalued and in recent years, the US Treasury Department has not threatened to label China as a currency manipulator.

人民幣匯率彈性增加還有助於平滑跨境資本流動。過去二十多年來，每當人民幣匯率呈現單邊走勢時，都會加速資本流入或者流出，使資本流動管理政策不斷收緊。每當人民幣匯率轉為雙向波動以後，如2012年、2014年和2017年，則會導致市場預期分化，形成「經常項目順差、資本項目逆差」的國際收支自主平衡格局。這時，資本流動管理政策反而會趨於逐步放鬆。

The increasing flexibility of the renminbi exchange rate has helped smooth the flow of cross-border capital. Over the last two decades or so, whenever the renminbi exchange rate showed a clear one-way trend, capital inflows or outflows would reflect this. As a result, capital flow management policies would be adjusted. When the renminbi exchange rate showed a two-way trading pattern, such as in 2012, 2014, and 2017, this led to a self-balancing pattern for the international balance of payments with current account surpluses and capital account deficits. At this point, authorities would gradually relax their capital flow management policies.

當然，對於匯率調節國際收支的作用也不能過高估計。「7·21」匯改之初，官方曾預測，如果人民幣一次性升值2%，將有助於貿易收支平衡；市場則判斷，如果人民幣升值5%以上，將對出口造成災難性的後果。但改革以後，人民幣大幅升值，反而使外貿出口做成了全球數一數二，進出口順差也越做越大，經常項目盈餘與GDP之比飆升。這既與匯率調節的滯後性有關，也反映了匯率調節的局限性。中國經濟的再平衡，從根本上說還是取決於「擴內需、調結構、減順差、促平衡」的一攬子改革與調整。近年來經常項目收支趨於平衡與國內服務業和最終消費拉動的經濟轉型升級趨於同步，就是最好的例證。美國則因為沒有觸及經濟結構性的調整，一味打貿易戰、貨幣戰，結果只產生了貿易差額轉移的效果，貿易失衡卻是愈演愈烈。

The role of exchange rate adjustments in the international balance of payments cannot be overestimated. At the beginning of the 2005 exchange rate reform, officials predicted that a one-time revaluation of the renminbi by 2% would help the trade balance. The market concluded that an appreciation of the renminbi of more than 5% would have had disastrous consequences for exports. However, after the reform, despite the strong appreciation of the renminbi China』s became a global export leader and the current account surplus widened sharply in absolute terms and as well as a percentage of GDP. This was related to the lag effect in exchange rate adjustments. The rebalancing of China』s economy requires a basket of measures such as the expansion of domestic demand, structural adjustments and reduced surpluses. In recent years, the current balance of international receipts and payments tends to be synchronized with the transformation and upgrading of the domestic service sector and domestic consumption. The US, for example, has focused on conducting trade wars and currency wars instead of making needed structural economic adjustments. This merely results in increasingly fierce trade imbalances and a transfer of trade imbalances.

結論：促進國際收支平衡，必須發揮匯率槓桿的調節作用。但是，經濟對外失衡是對內失衡的表現，實現經濟對外再平衡，根本上還是要解決國內經濟失衡的問題。

To promote a greater balance of international payments, exchange rate leverage must be brought into play. External imbalances in the economy are a manifestation of internal imbalances. Therefore, to achieve rebalancing of the economy, it is necessary to solve the fundamental problems of domestic economic imbalances.

適應人民幣匯率彈性增加的新常態

New Normal

十九大明確提出，要完善社會主義市場經濟體制，推動形成全面開放的新格局，建設開放型世界經濟。匯率是兩個貨幣的比價關係，連接著國內國際兩個市場。推進匯率形成市場化是深化改革、擴大開放的題中應有之意。近日，中國在博鰲論壇上宣布了一系列對外開放，特別是金融開放的新舉措。央行行長易綱明確指出，金融業對外開放必須與匯率形成機制改革相匹配。

It is necessary to adapt to the new normal of renminbi exchange rate flexibility. The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly stated that it is necessary to improve the socialist market economic system, promote a full opening of the domestic economy and build an open global economy. The exchange rate is the price relationship of two currencies, thereby connecting the domestic and international markets. Promoting a more market-based exchange rate is the aim of deeper reforms and an expanded opening up to the outside world. At the recent Boao Forum for Asia, China announced a series of new measures for opening its economy, including the financial sector. Yi Gang, the governor of China』s central bank, clearly stated that the opening up of the financial sector must keep pace with the reform of the exchange rate mechanism.

「8·11」匯改，優化了中間價形成機制，在人民幣匯率市場化道路上邁出了重要一步。雖然因為市場環境惡化，改革受到困擾，但隨著外匯形勢趨穩，央行已撤回了包括「逆周期因子」在內的臨時性措施，回歸政策中性。

The 2015 exchange rate reform optimized the currency』s mid-price formation mechanism. That was an important step in the marketization of the renminbi exchange rate. Although the reforms were hampered by the deterioration of the overall market environment, the central bank eventually returned to policy neutrality as the foreign exchange situation stabilized. It withdrew temporary measures, including the counter-cyclical factor.

所謂政策中性，在匯率政策方面表現為，匯率調控主要是為防止匯率過度或異常波動，而不是替市場選擇匯率水平。這才有了2018年以來人民幣匯率波動性的進一步增加。然而，一些人似乎尚未適應這種變化，還在糾結於人民幣匯率漲跌，揣摩匯率政策意圖，期待著有形之手施加影響。他們卻忽視了，在市場預期分化、外匯供求平衡、出口快速成長的情況下，匯率調控缺乏必要性。

Policy neutrality, as far as exchange rate policy is concerned, is designed to prevent excessive volatility in the exchange rate, rather than choosing an exchange rate target on behalf of the market. This has further increased the volatility of the renminbi exchange rate since 2018. Apparently, some people have not yet adapted to this change. They are still concerned with the rise and fall of the renminbi exchange rate, trying to figure out the intent of exchange rate policy. They expect to see a government hand exerting influence on the market. However, they have overlooked the need for exchange rate adjustments amid market fragmentation, a basic balance between foreign exchange supply and demand and a rapid growth in exports.

人民幣匯率波動性增加將成為一種新常態。企業與其猜測匯率的方向，還不如樹立風險中性意識，立足主業，做好匯率風險的管理工作。2017年9月，央行將遠期購匯的外匯風險準備金比率降至零，實際已釋放了這方面的信號。也正是從那時起，銀行遠期結售匯由順差轉為逆差。

The increase in the volatility of the renminbi exchange rate will become a new normal. Instead of guessing the direction of the exchange rate, enterprises should establish a risk-neutral awareness, and try their best to manage exchange rate risks in their main business area. In September 2017, the central bank reduced the foreign exchange risk reserve ratio for forward foreign exchange purchases to zero, and this sent an important signal to the market. From that time onwards bank forward settlements shifted from a surplus to a deficit.

結論：深化匯率市場化改革是擴大開放必須邁過去的坎兒。無論政府還是市場，都要逐漸增加對匯率波動的容忍度和適應性。

Deepening the market-oriented reform of the exchange rate is a challenge that must be dealt with in order to expand the opening-up to the outside world. The government and the market should gradually increase their tolerance of exchange rate fluctuations.

本文發表在《CHINA FOREX》2018年第2期

作者系武漢大學董輔礽經濟社會發展研究院董輔礽講座教授、中國金融四十人論壇高級研究員

The author is a professor at the Dong Furen Economic and Social Development Institute of Wuhan University and a senior researcher at China Finance 40 Forum.

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