【聚焦】美媒大幅引述中國智庫觀點，中國不會走美國路！

原標題：【聚焦】美媒大幅引述中國智庫觀點，中國不會走美國路！

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受訪專家王文系中國人民大學重陽金融研究院執行院長。本文發表於2018年8月30日《參考消息》，原標題是《中國不會重走美式強國之路》。原文刊於2018年8月29日美國彭博社通稿，原標題是《中國成為超級大國會是什麼樣的？一點也不像美國 》（作者馬克·錢皮恩），文後附有英文版。

除了嚴寒，南極洲給王文留下深刻印象的是美國在這種惡劣環境下開展活動的浩大聲勢，和南極點地理標誌旁邊飄揚著的美國國旗。看著數百名美國科學家在這個資源豐富的地區進行科考，他暗下決心：中國必須迎頭趕上。

王文是中國人民大學重陽金融研究院執行院長，他今年夏天為該研究院撰寫的報告深入思考了中國在向並非由它創立的國際體系艱難進軍過程中面臨的困境。

北京不可避免地從美國這個唯一超級大國身上尋找超級大國的衡量標準———是擁有一支遠洋海軍，還是在南極洲建立更多科考站？不過，共產黨領導人又不願意被視為下一個全球霸主，不願承擔與之相伴隨的開銷。他們刻意迴避「超級大國」一詞，認為美國版的「超級大國」在意識形態上是不可接受的。

中國是否會成為超級大國、它是否能承受相關成本等問題將影響世界幾十年。它們將塑造貿易條件、不斷變化的全球秩序以及戰爭與和平問題。當被問及作為強國的中國會是什麼樣時，王文表示：「我們不知道，反正不會像美國那樣。」

然而，套用俄國革命家列夫·托洛茨基的話說，即使中國對成為超級大國不感興趣，超級大國恐怕也會對它感興趣。美國當年開始登上世界舞台時也曾下定決心不仿效早先的殖民帝國。如今，11個航母群和眾多軍事基地分布在全球保護其利益。

中國或許走上了類似的道路。航母建造計劃正在施行，第一個海外軍事基地去年在非洲之角的吉布地建成。外交機構的開支大幅增加。「中國製造2025」旨在取代美國成為世界科技強國，而另一項計劃呼籲到2030年在人工智慧領域佔據主導地位。

根據斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所的數據，中國的國防開支去年為2280億美元，是俄羅斯軍費預算的3倍多。中國這麼做輕而易舉———軍隊在政府總支出中所佔的份額實際上還下降了———說明中國可以成為它想成為的任何一種力量。

已經有跡象表明，中國發展模式可能會比美國和國際貨幣基金組織等戰後機構長期以來倡導的自由主義理想更有吸引力。不過，如果說這是一個正在形成的超級大國，那它恐怕也是脆弱的。

澳大利亞國防部負責情報工作的前副部長保羅·迪布認為：「中國將不是要在槍支和黃油之間作出選擇，是要在槍支和老年人護理之間作出選擇。」

王文對中國的未來充滿無限的信心。他反感殖民時代的探險家如羅伯特·斯科特爭先恐後地把國旗插上南極並宣示領土主權，但也欽佩他們的「大無畏精神」。

「當代中國人是不是應該汗顏呢？」他從南極回來後撰文稱。他覺得有一場「激烈」的地緣政治鬥爭正在進行中。他擔心，如果沒有更強大的聲音和存在，中國將輸掉。

南極洲只是中國在全球範圍內維護自身利益時所面臨的挑戰之一。

今年1月，中國發布了首份北極政策白皮書，概述了中國創建「冰上絲綢之路」的雄心。中國已經為「一帶一路」倡議投入了數千億美元。與此同時，為了在國防支出方面趕上美國，中國需要每年再拿出4000億美元。即使對中國來說，這些也是大筆開銷。

喬治·華盛頓大學教授沈大偉表示，中國汲取了蘇聯失敗的核心教訓，那就是過度依賴軍事實力。除了武器之外，超級大國還要有技術、強大的經濟和軟實力影響。「中國明白這一點。」他說。

中國與全球化智庫理事長王輝耀表示，中國不想破壞由美國塑造的世界秩序，因為它從中受益。但中國確實想打造所謂的全球化2.0，給世界秩序增添新的國際架構，包括亞洲基礎設施投資銀行。

王輝耀說，中國的規模讓人感到害怕，但中國不過是想讓全球化更具包容性。

附彭博社英文報道（節選）

What Does a Chinese Superpower Look Like? Nothing Like the U.S.

Source: Bloomberg Published: 2018-8-28

What struck Wang Wen about Antarctica, beyond the brutality of the December cold, was the scale of U.S. operations in such an inhospitable environment and the American flag fluttering by the sign that marks the geographic South Pole. Observing the academic mission of hundreds of U.S. scientists in a region rich in resource potential, he was determined that China must catch up.

The report Wang wrote this summer for the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China in Beijing, where he』s executive dean, reflects China』s growing dilemma as it muscles its way into an international system it didn』t create.

For the first time in its long history, China has a truly global vision. So, inevitably, Beijing looks to the U.S., the sole superpower, for a yardstick as to what that requires—be it a blue water navy or more research stations in Antarctica.

Chinese research team members have lunch at a dock of the Great Wall Station in Antarctica, Jan. 2017.

Yet Communist Party leaders also recoil at being seen as the next global hegemon and are reluctant to shoulder the expense that goes with it. They studiously avoid the word 「superpower」 and see the American version of it as ideologically unacceptable and spent.

Whether China does become a superpower and whether it could sustain the costs involved are questions that will impact the world for decades. They will shape terms of trade, a changing global order, and issues of war and peace. 「We don』t know,」 Wang said over dinner a few floors below his institute, when asked what Chinese great power will look like. 「Anything but America.」

Yet to misquote Leon Trotsky, even if China isn』t interested in becoming a superpower, superpower may be interested in it. The U.S., too, began its journey on the world stage determined not to replicate earlier colonial empires. Today, 11 carrier groups and a network of military bases span the globe to protect its interests.

China"s first home-built aircraft carrier at the port of Dalian.

China may be heading down a similar path. An aircraft carrier construction program is underway. Its first overseas military base opened last year, in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Spending for diplomatic service is up sharply. China』s 「Made in China 2025」 economic project aims to displace the U.S. as the world』s technological power, while another plan calls for dominance in Artificial Intelligence by 2030.

The country raised defense spending from $21 billion in 1990 to $228 billion last year, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, more than three times Russia』s budget. The ease with which it did so——the military』s share of overall government spending actually fell——suggests China can be any kind of power it wants.

Already there are signs a Chinese model for development could gain traction against the ideals long promoted by the U.S. and post-war institutions like the International Monetary Fund.

However, if this is a superpower in the making, it may be a fragile one.

To Paul Dibb, a former deputy secretary for intelligence in Australia』s defense department, it』s telling that Beijing spends more on internal security than defense. 「China will have to choose not between guns and butter,」 he said, 「but between guns and elderly care.」

Wang exudes limitless confidence in China』s future. It took four days to travel from Beijing to Antarctica. On the final leg, flying low over the vast icy expanse, Wang and others sucked oxygen from masks in the plane』s decompressed cabin. He is repelled by stories of colonist-era explorers like Robert Scott, who raced to plant their flags and stake territorial claims. Yet he also admires their 「fearless spirit」 and willingness to sacrifice.

Members of a scientific exploration team from south China"s Shantou University sail on a research vessel in the Antarctic waters in 2014.

「Should we contemporary Chinese be ashamed?」 he wrote on his return, in the Chinese language Global Times.

An ice sheet with a mean depth of 1.6 miles (2.6 kilometers) has protected Antarctica』s resources from exploration. Still, Wang』s report says that below the surface is an estimated 500 billion tons of coal, as much as 100 billion barrels of oil, and 5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Despite a 1959 treaty which freezes all territorial claims, at least for now, Wang sees a 「fierce」 geopolitical struggle underway. He fears that, without a stronger voice and presence, China will lose out.

「President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that China must participate more actively into rule-settings in new areas, including deep sea, polar regions, outer space and the Internet,」 his report concludes.

Containers used as temporary buildings for China"s fifth research station on Inexpressible Island in Terra Nova Bay in the Ross Sea, Antarctica in Jan. 2018.

In practice, that would mean building infrastructure to accommodate tourists and beefing up Beijing』s research presence, the key determinant of influence in Antarctica』s multinational administration.

The U.S. budget request for the Office of Polar Programs in 2019 is $534 million. From 2001 to 2016, according to Wang』s report, China invested 310 million yuan ($45 million) in its Antarctic program.Beijing could easily afford the difference, but Antarctica is just one challenge China faces as it asserts its interests around the globe.

In January, China published its first white paper on the other pole, the Arctic, outlining its ambition for a 「Polar Silk Road.」 It proposes building new-design icebreaker vessels and bases, essential tools in an area with fewer barriers to territorial claims than the southern polar cap.

Silk Road is another name for the Belt and Road Initiative, into which China has already sunk hundreds of billions of dollars. Meanwhile, to match the U.S. on defense spending, China would need to find another $400 billion a year. Even for China, these are large costs.

China grasps the core lesson of the former Soviet Union』s failure—its over-reliance on military strength, according to David Shambaugh, a professor at George Washington University and author of numerous books on China. Beyond weapons, superpowers require technology, strong economies and soft power influence to sustain themselves. 「China understands that,」 he said.

According to Henry Wang, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing. True, China doesn』t want to destroy the world order that the U.S. shaped, as it has benefited from it. But it does want to create what he calls globalization 2.0, by adding new international structures including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

「People get scared」 by China』s size, according to Wang. China just wants globalization that』s more inclusive, he says.

「Our country has entered a very interesting phase that the Western social sciences can』t explain,」 said Wang Wen, singling out conventional economics as especially inept. 「If you use Western theory, you cannot understand China』s foreign policy.」

Wang Wen is executive dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China.

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